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Among those I call the great men of the world are Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison, and various others who participated in formulating
the ideas behind the First Amendment for this country and in writing
it. ... The First Amendment is truly the heart of the Bill of Rights.
The Framers balanced its freedoms of religion, speech, press, assem-
bly, and petition against the needs of a powerful central government,
and decided that in those freedoms lies this nation's only true secur-
ity. They were not afraid for men to be free. We should not be.1
I. INTRODUCTION
HURCH-state relations have proved to be one of the more emo-
tional, controversial, and confusing issues in American society.
From colonial establishments of religions, 2 to the First Amend-
ment prohibition against establishment and guarantee of free exercise, 3 to
contemporary calls for a pseudo-establishment, 4 the American people
have been deeply divided over religion and its place in public life. The
issue has been complicated by the polarizing politicizing of religion.
1. JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 6 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) (statement
of Justice Hugo Black).
2. See generally MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 25-65 (1992) (providing a detailed analysis of the establishment of
colonial religious sects).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
4. Many public figures have condemned church-state separation as legal and histori-
cal fiction:
The time has come, for those who deplore present trends and wish to resist
them, to invoke their knowledge of history sufficiently to proclaim that fanat-
ical interpretations of the separation clause of the First Amendment are un-
related to protecting the public from the illusory threat of an established
religion.... Conservatives should be adamant about the need for the reap-
pearance of Judeo-Christianity in the public square.
William F. Buckley, Agenda for the Nineties, NAT'L REV., Feb. 19, 1990, at 34. "By relearn-
ing the facts that a righteous new government came from a righteous people seeking to
advance the kingdom of Christ, it will be possible to reverse the ungodly laws of this gener-
ation." CATHERINE MILLARD, THE REWRITING OF AMERICA'S HISTORY (1991). "We
must reestablish the beauty and fullness in love of a Christian nation that was once ours."
FRANK SCHAEFFER, A TIME FOR ANGER: THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY 78 (1982). "God
blessed this nation because in its early days she sought to honor God and the Bible, the
inerrant word of the living God. Any diligent student of American history finds that our
great nation was founded by godly men upon godly principles to be a Christian nation."
JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN AMERICA! 25 (1980).
1580 [Vol. 49
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Political parties have seized the Christian faith, made Christian tenets a
part of party platforms, 5 and painted a portrait of the Founding Fathers as
devout Christians6 who were hostile to church-state separation.
Unfortunately, the religious liberty philosophy of the Founding Fa-
thers, the history of American church-state relations, and the legislative
intent of the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses have been clouded by partisan bickering. The political debate
has pushed both sides to the fringes of the argument, with separationists
becoming adamantly opposed to the slightest influence of religion in sec-
ular society and the opposition organizing at the grassroots level to essen-
tially try and resurrect some form of socialized religion.
Neither side involved in what has now transmogrified from a historical
debate into a political debate has done much to clarify the intent of the
Founding Fathers regarding religion in secular society. This Comment
traces the origins of church-state relations in America from the seven-
teenth century through the landmark decisions of Lemon v. Kurtzman7
and Sherbert v. Verner.8 Particular emphasis is given to the early life,
influences, and writings of James Madison, the principle architect of the
First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Widely re-
garded as "America's premier exponent and practitioner of the principle
of freedom of conscience,"9 Madison essentially spurred and consum-
mated the American religious liberty 10 debate and position. Conse-
quently, as a genuine understanding of religious liberty in the context of
the First Amendment can only be obtained by examining the legislative
history, Part II of this Comment attempts to expose the convictions of the
Amendment's author."1
5. See, e.g., Judi Hasson, Religion Shares Convention Stage: 'Moral Issues' Are Focus,
USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 1992, at 4A (discussing the 1992 National Republican Party Plat-
form that was "heavy with references to God and the Scriptures").
6. In the historical view of many, "[tihe overwhelming majority of the Founding Fa-
thers of this nation were raised and believed in the Christian faith." TIM LAHAYE, FAITH
OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS xi (1987).
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 11.
10. The term religious liberty has been bandied about in recent years and has assumed
a variety of connotative meanings. Supporters and antagonizers of church-state separation
have used the term to support strict separation and liberal accommodation. Hence, it is
necessary to place the term in its proper context. For the purposes of this Comment, reli-
gious liberty will assume its traditional denotative meaning:
Freedom, as guaranteed by [the] First Amendment of [the United States]
Constitution, from constraint, or control in matters affecting the conscience,
religious beliefs, and the practice of religion. Freedom to entertain and ex-
press any or no system of religious opinions, and to engage in or refrain from
any form of religious observance or public or private religious worship, not
inconsistent with the peace and good order of society and the general
welfare.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (6th ed. 1990).
11. Madison biographer Irving Brant cogently explains the historical importance of
James Madison:
To know what ultimate position James Madison will hold in his country's
history one must know what that country's future will be. If the American
1996]
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Once the historical church-state position has been established, Part III
turns to the judicial treatment of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses prior to Lemon and Sherbert. Judicial treatment of religious lib-
erty was hardly cohesive prior to 1971. Although laws that prohibited
unlawful religious activity were consistently upheld,12 others that clearly
established tenets of Christianity were sporadically declared constitu-
tional as well. 13
The United States Supreme Court attempted to bring conciliation be-
tween federal and state courts on the Establishment Clause question with
its decision in Lemon. Part IV of this Comment analyzes this landmark
case, the First Amendment test established by the Court, and a few of the
plethora of decisions that have relied on Lemon. In addition, a survey of
select twentieth century judicial opinions of justices hostile to contempo-
rary interpretations of religious liberty are examined. Special emphasis is
given to the opinions of the Court's most vocal separation antagonist,
Justice Scalia, with a cursory analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist's views.
Although Lemon was intended to essentially end the debate and bring
judicial harmony to the Establishment Clause question, the late twentieth
century has witnessed a continuing attempt to dramatically alter this as-
pect of religious liberty. For instance, President Ronald Reagan made
Supreme Court appointments with a few primary objectives. One was
assuredly to, at the very least, increase religion's (namely, Christianity's)
involvement and influence in American society. Indeed, Mr. Reagan's
covert agenda to bring down the wall in Germany 14 was analogous to his
attempt to bring down the wall of separation between church and state. 15
people abandon the rights and liberties he worked so hard to establish, he
will be forgotten along with them. Should those rights and liberties be taken
away by force or deception, they and he will continue to live in hope and
aspiration. If they are maintained and cherished, the memory of James
Madison will be as enduring as the mountains at which he looked so often
across field and forest from his Virginia home.
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 13.
12. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a Utah statute
declaring bigamy committed in its territories a crime against the United States); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1878) (Idaho statute prohibiting bigamists from voting or holding
public office not unconstitutional).
13. Compare State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214 (Mo. 1854) (religiously based statute compel-
ling the observance of Sunday declared constitutional) and Swan v. Swan, 21 Fed. 299(1884) (laws of Arkansas prohibiting the performance of labor on Sunday are a legitimate
exercise of police power) and Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6 (Cal. 1881) (prohibiting persons
from transacting business on Sunday does not interfere with religious liberty, namely, the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship) with Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (Cal.
1858) (declaring language of an act "for the better observance of the Sabbath" unconstitu-
tional and void as a violation of religious freedom by enforcing the compulsory observance
of a day held sacred by believers in one religion and thus discriminated in its favor).
14. See Carl Bernstein, The Holy Alliance, TIME, Feb. 24, 1992, at 28 ("Faced with a
military crackdown in Poland, Ronald Reagan and John Paul II secretly joined forces to
keep the Solidarity union alive.... [They] agreed to undertake a clandestine campaign to
hasten the dissolution of the communist empire.... This was one of the great secret alli-
ances of all time.").
15. "[J]udical appointments in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s ... were specifically in-
tended by Presidents Richard Nixon, Reagan, and Bush to undo Supreme Court decisions
1582 [Vol. 49
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Part V of this Comment discusses the origins of the Christian conserva-
tive movement and its influence in a grassroots attempt to reunite reli-
gion and secular society. Part V touches on the moment of silence
statutes passed by a number of state legislatures. 16 The legislative history
of these statutes provide some evidence that the ultimate goal was to
bring prayer back to public schools, bring a heightened Christian influ-
ence into the classrooms and hence cure the moral decline of society.' 7
These legislatures have been heavily influenced by grassroots organiza-
tions, such as the Christian Coalition 18 through its legal arm, the Ameri-
can Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ). 19 The ACLJ has argued a
number of cases before the United States Supreme Court and federal and
state courts on behalf of religious accommodation. Justice Scalia and,
affecting a variety of public policy issues." CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN
SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 7 (1993). Smith explains
that Presidents Reagan and Bush made concerted efforts to alter social public policy
through judicial appointments by emphasizing the appointment of very young judges, all of
whom had to pass the strict conservative litmus test. In fact, "the Reagan administration
'engaged in the most systematic ideological or judicial philosophical screening of judicial
candidates since the first Roosevelt administration.' " Id. at 13 (quoting Sheldon
Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICA-
TURE 326 (1987)).
16. Georgia, South Carolina, and Utah are among those states that have passed laws
mandating that each public school morning begin with approximately sixty seconds of si-
lence for reflection, meditation, or silent prayer.
17. This Comment does not extensively address the issue of prayer in public schools.
Public school prayer is a treatise in itself and volumes have addressed and continue to
address this volatile issue. See, e.g., Jeff Horner & Ben Barlow, Prayer in Public Schools in
Light of Lee v. Weisman and Its Progeny, 87 EDUC. L. REP. 323 (1994); Allan Gordus,
Note, The Establishment Clause and Prayers in Public High School Graduations: Jones v.
Clear Creek Independent School District, 47 ARK. L. REV. 653 (1994); Herbert S. Fain, Jr.,
Prayer in Public Schools: A Moment of Silence, 15 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 27 (1989); Mary
E. Quinn-Johnson, Comment, School Prayer and the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48
MD. L. REV. 1018 (1989); John C. Walden, Are Prayers in High School Football Games
Unconstitutional?, 39 EDUC. L. REP. 493 (1987); Mariellen F. Scott & Perry A. Zirkel, The
Legality of Prayer in the Public Schools: Teachers' Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice, 36
EDUC. L. REP. 533 (1987).
18. The Christian Coalition is a grassroots organization formed by Pat Robertson after
his failed 1988 presidential bid "to preserve Christian freedom and religious values in
America." PAT ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE: THE FALL OF LIBERALISM AND THE
RISE OF COMMON SENSE 107 (1993). It is an outgrowth of the extinct Moral Majority
founded by Jerry Falwell. The Coalition trains, fields, endorses, and campaigns for
predominantly Christian conservative candidates at the school board, local and state levels;
additionally, it has recently become intimately involved in United States Senate and House
of Representatives races. "The Christian Coalition is launching an effort in selected states
to become acquainted with registered voters in every precinct." PAT ROBERTSON, NEW
WORLD ORDER: IT WILL CHANGE THE WAY You LIVE 261 (1991). Its ultimate goal was
to have a Conservative Republican (supposedly the party that unilaterally supports a
heightened Christian influence in secular society) in the United States Senate by 1992 and
a majority in the House of Representatives by 1996. Id. Nevertheless, the election goals of
the Christian Coalition were accelerated with the election of a Republican majority in the
Senate and the House after the 1994 elections. Richard Wolf, GOP Rattles Dems: Power
Shifting in Senate, House, States, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1A.
19. The ACLJ consists of a team of attorneys, including the highly visible and vocal
lead counsel, Jay Sekulow. Sekulow and the ACLJ are engaged in an organized attempt to
dramatically alter religious liberty by primarily litigating public school prayer cases, includ-
ing a number of high profile cases before the United States Supreme Court. See infra note
315 and accompanying text.
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more recently, Justice Thomas20 have provided a sympathetic ear for the
ACLJ's and other religious liberty law firms' attempts to reunite religion
and secular society.
Part V also touches on the movement currently underway to alter the
First Amendment. Two constitutional amendments have been introduced
into the House of Representatives to allow student-led prayer in public
schools and government funding of religious symbols.21 This effort is due
in part to lobbying efforts by Christian conservatives. They have success-
fully convinced many legislators that Christians in the public sector are
effectively being persecuted; in this regard, Part V examines the argu-
ments by Christian conservatives that they are a persecuted minority.
Part VI concludes that present and future Supreme Court religious lib-
erty decisions are and will be essentially a product of presidential elec-
tions.22 The viability of stare decisis appears destined to be dependent
upon partisan politics. Hence, given the inability of Lemon and other
cases to solve the religious liberty debate and the covert litmus tests ap-
plied to potential Supreme Court nominees, the entire religious liberty
structure will remain in perpetual flux. Nevertheless, this Comment ad-
vocates that current interpretations of the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses should be perpetuated.
II. COLONIAL CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS, THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, AND THE GENESIS OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
A. IN THE BEGINNING
From the beginning, European explorers took a religious interest in
America. 23 The very first entry in the diary of Christopher Columbus
during his journey to America in 1492 expressed the desire to interact
with the native peoples to discover "the manner in which may be under-
taken their conversion to our Holy Faith."' 24 Despite failing to unilater-
20. Justice Thomas consistently votes with Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In fact, during his first term, Justice Thomas voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia 75% of the time. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, The First-Term Perform-
ance of Justice Clarence Thomas, 76 JUDICATURE 172, 172-78 (1993).
21. See infra notes 341-50 and accompanying text.
22. For instance, Presidents Reagan and Bush made concerted efforts to appoint con-
servative justices to the United States Supreme Court from 1980 to 1992, with one of the
primary goals being the revisiting of cases that conservatives considered bad law.
Although President Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork (clearly one of the more
conservative judges in the United States) failed, other appointments of justices hostile to
church-state separation succeeded (see, for example, the appointments of Justices Scalia
and Thomas). These ulterior motives were nearly brought to fruition with the Court's
attempt to overturn the abortion decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The con-
servative wing of the Court had decided to overturn Roe and penned the majority decision
before an eleventh hour change of heart by Justice Kennedy. See SMITH, supra note 15, at
96 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). Casey is a clear example of the
elasticity of stare decisis.
23. NOLL, supra note 2, at 11.
24. Id. at 12.
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ally or significantly proselytize Native Americans, the religious influence
of explorers and settlers resounded throughout America during the colo-
nial period.
The Church of England, which was an offshoot of the Roman Catholic
Church, was the established church in Europe, and as the state religion,
compulsory adherence to its doctrines was required.25 The Protestant
Reformation initiated by Martin Luther was a response to Roman Ca-
tholicism and the Church of England.26 A liberation from the stifling tra-
ditions of Europe, including the oppressive Church of England,
"stimulated exploration across the Atlantic. ' '2 7
Puritans, who were among the earliest settlers to establish a presence
in America, were a part of the Protestant Reformation in England. "Pu-
ritans wanted to wipe out the vestiges of Roman Catholic worship and
doctrine that survived within the Church of England. ''2 8 This desire and
the failure of Puritans and other Protestants to purge the Church of Eng-
land in Europe were primary reasons for the en mass migration to
America. 29
Paradoxically, Puritans, aside from a few exceptions, 30 adopted a creed
that turned out to be contrary to the interests of religious liberty and as
oppressive as the Church of England. For example:
Puritans believed that God created society as a unified whole.
Church and state, the individual and the public, are not unrelated
spheres of life but are complementary, intimately connected by
God's acts of creation and his continuing providence. This convic-
tion lay behind the Puritan effort to reform all of English society. It
also provided the stimulus for the Puritan effort to fashion colonies
in the New World in which all parts of colonial life would reflect the
glory of God.... [I]t led to the high-handedness and intolerance that
Puritans sometimes displayed in both Britain and America when
they were in control. Since they presumed to know the will of God
so clearly, they felt it was only right that they could force others to
comply, even if those others did not understand God the same way
they did.31
Despite fleeing religious oppression in Europe-abhorring the intolerant
Church of England and its dogmatic citizenry control-Puritans crafted
25. See F. MAKOWER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND 68-95 (1895) (discussing the religious doctrines and religious strife
of the Church of England).
26. NOLL, supra note 2, at 31.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Puritans were the "single most influential cultural force at work" in colonial
America. A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 53 (1985). In fact,
by the time of the American Revolution, some 75% of American citizens had been raised
with some form of Puritan influence. SYDNEY E. ALHSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 169 (1975). Puritanism was a vital force in the formation of essen-
tially all of England's colonies in America. REICHLEY, supra, at 55.
30. Roger Williams, one of the most famous Puritans in New England, believed that




their Protestant doctrine with prima facie religious intolerance.32 Unfor-
tunately, the Puritan edict became the exordium of official religious es-
tablishments throughout colonial America.
Aside from Rhode Island, "all of the colonies erected 'establishments'
of some sort."'33 This is mind boggling, given their disdain for socialized
religion in Europe. Nevertheless, the colonies established religious sects,
although the colonies' "establishments" were pursued with varying de-
grees of vigor.
For instance, the Church of England "was the established church in...
the Carolinas, Georgia, Maryland after 1691, and parts of New York City
after 1693."34 Additionally, the Jamestown settlers quickly established
the Church of England in the Virginia colony in 1607. This made life
intolerable for Catholics and Quakers and uncomfortable for Protestant
dissent. These tenuous conditions continued for more than one hundred
years. In fact, the Puritans in Massachusetts had covenanted together to
establish "God's New Israel" by 1630.35 "Their 'city upon a hill' was a
beacon of intolerance of all dissent, a theocracy that made life impossible
for Quakers, Catholics, separatists, and freethinkers. '36 This totalitarian
government in Massachusetts, using the Bible as apparent authority and
serving as an example for other colonies, continued this religious totali-
tarianism until the nineteenth century. Theocratic governments existed
openly and defiantly during these early years. 37
One isolated exception was the Rhode Island territory. Roger Wil-
liams began the Providence settlement in 1656, which "admitted no reser-
vations respecting religious liberty. ' 38 Williams and many of the
Providence settlers were devoutly religious. Nonetheless, the settlers,
with Williams leading the way, were convinced that their theological con-
victions gave them no right to impose their own definitions on others.39
32. Id.
33. John Wilson, Church and State in America, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY, supra note 1, at 97, 105.
34. NOLL, supra note 2, at 63.
35. JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 14.
36. Id. President Reagan embraced this Puritan ideal, often referring to America as a
"city on a hill." In one paradigmatical observation he proclaimed, "Who but a Divine
Providence could have placed this nation here... this new Jerusalem, this shining City on a
Hill." Chris Smith & Mark Souder, Help States Fight Illegal Aliens... But Protect Legal
Immigrants, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at A17.
37. For example, in Massachusetts the only individuals allowed to participate in the
political process, including the right to vote, were those certified as "orthodox in the funda-
mentals of religion." LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 74 (rev. ed. 1967).
Those violating these provisions were prosecuted as "heretics." THOMAS L. TEDFORD,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
SION 18 (1963). In 1641, the General Court of Massachusetts decreed that the state "civil
authority" had the duty to ensure that "the people be fed wholesome and sound doctrine."
PFEFFER, supra, at 75. Four years later, this same body declared that "damnable heresies
... ought to be duly restrained" and adopted the Act Against Heresy, which punished
anyone who "den[ied] the immortality of the soul, or the resurrection, sin in the regener-
ate, or the need of repentance." Id.




"Combining reason and piety Williams effected a system of church-state
separation that was and remains the sterling example of a principle
brought to practical fruition. '40
The influx of varying Protestant sects disrupted the harmonious colo-
nial denominations. Scottish-Irish Presbyterians in Anglican Virginia,
German Mennonites in Quaker Pennsylvania, Anglicans in Congrega-
tional Connecticut and Massachusetts all contributed to the growing reli-
gious melting pot.41 Growing religious diversity notwithstanding, many
Puritans had no desire to accommodate divergent religious perspectives.
For example, John Cotton, a seventeenth century Puritan leader, ex-
plained that "[toleration made the world anti-Christian. '42 He went on
to exhort: "My heart has naturally detested ... toleration of diverse reli-
gions, or of one religion in segregate shapes. ' 43 Cotton further stated
that the only liberty the established sect owed to dissidents was "the lib-
erty to keep away from us."'44 Nevertheless, the rising number of reli-
gious liberty voices provided the framework for the establishment of new
colonies and sects.
One of these new colonies, Virginia, founded in 1607, established the
Anglican church as its official religion. Its pre-commonwealth govern-
ment, however, proved to be far more tolerant than the dogmatic Puri-
tans. For instance, the English Act of Toleration of 1689 gave Protestant
dissenters who registered their places of worship the right to hold public
services.45 As a result, dissenters accounted for approximately two-thirds
of the white population in Virginia by the time of the American Revolu-
tion.46 This made toleration of religious sects necessary, and hence the
roots of religious liberty began to develop.47
B. THE EMERGENCE OF JAMES MADISON
In the midst of a nation searching for identity and suffering religious
growing pains came James Madison. Standing only five feet six inches
40. Id. at 15.
41. Wilson, supra note 33, at 105.
42. THE AMERICAN PURITANS 98 (Perry Miller ed., 1956).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. REICHLEY, supra note 29, at 85.
46. PHILLIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE AMERICAN
IDEA OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS 28 (1972). Although church-
state evolution of each colony is intriguing, Virginia is clearly the Constitutional genesis of
the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Consequently, although
other colonial developments (for example, Massachusetts and Plymouth) are relevant, they
are not as material to the ideology behind American religious liberty development.
47. See generally CHARLES F. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA (1971); THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, S.J., CHURCH AND
STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 (1977) (providing an in depth examina-
tion of the religious liberty climate in Virginia and other colonies); Daniel L. Dreisbach,
Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-
1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159
(1990) (analyzing the religious liberty development of Virginia).
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tall, oft-ill, 48 plagued by a weak voice, and essentially bereft of most of
the conventional characteristics of a "great leader," James Madison at
first glance seems hardly qualified to be called a Founding Father. None-
theless, he more than compensated for his traditional shortcomings with
"his rigorously logical mind, appetite for reading, and indefatigable indus-
try."'49 His superior intelligence, religious convictions, 50 and love of his
country led him to the College of New Jersey 51 in 1769, a college with a
reputation for "religious strictness and staunch patriotism. '52
James Madison was a resilient student and particularly enjoyed govern-
ment and history. Following his graduation, he spent several months
studying Hebrew, law, and ethics and was exposed to a number of Scot-
tish intellectual philosophies. The foregoing exposure brought James
Madison to a realization that is essential to government, as well as to
society as a whole: "The study of history yields generalizations about
human nature and thus furnishes guidelines for the governance of human
48. Biographer Ralph Ketcham explains James Madison's physical condition as
paradoxical:
He was described frequently as "feeble," "pale," or "sickly," and he wrote
repeatedly of bouts of illness and fears that poor health would prevent his
doing something or other, yet he lived to be eighty-five years old and until
his last years seems not to have suffered seriously or chronically from an
identifiable disease.
RALPH L. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 51 (1971).
49. A. E. Dick Howard, James Madison and the Founding of the Republic, in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 21.
50. James Madison, like many of the founding fathers, was, in rhetoric, deeply reli-
gious. His "idea of religion ... was one of a highly personal relationship between the
individual and his maker." REICHLEY, supra note 29, at 93. Assuredly, however, one could
question the sincerity of a religious conviction that condones, participates in, and fosters
the enslavement of fellow human beings. Some argue that "Madison, Jefferson, and even
Washington were not in 'any meaningful sense Christians."' Id. at 368 n.98. Nonetheless,
"they adhered to the broad tenets of Judeo-Christian doctrine." Id.
Clifford Goldstein offers a caustic yet tenable theory about the sincerity of the Christian
principles of early Americans:
One wonders just what those "godly principles" were. Were they found in
the uprooting and massacre of thousands upon thousands of Native Ameri-
cans by "a righteous people seeking to advance the kingdom of God"? Were
they in the enslavement of millions of black Africans upon whose raging
sweat and spilled blood this "Christian nation" was built? Or were they in
the persecution of religious dissenters in the early days, when America
"sought to honor God and the Bible"?
CLIFFORD GOLDSTEIN, DAY OF THE DRAGON: How CURRENT EVENTS HAVE SET THE
STAGE FOR AMERICA'S PROPHETIC TRANSFORMATION 69-70 (1993) (Mr. Goldstein is edi-
tor of Liberty, a magazine devoted to religious liberty issues).
In addition, "Benjamin Franklin, though president of the Pennsylvania Abolition Soci-
ety, wanted to send away all blacks and preserve America for 'the lovely White and Red."'
DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 7 (3d ed. 1992). "In his origi-
nal draft of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, a slaveholder himself,
included a paragraph critical of King George's sanction of the slave trade." Id. at 26. In
fact, Jefferson "never deviated from his lifelong conviction that the Negro must be freed so
as 'to be removed beyond the reach of mixture' so that he would not stain 'the blood of his
master."' Id.
51. The College of New Jersey is now known as Princeton University.
52. Howard, supra note 49, at 22.
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affairs."5 3
Madison's passion for public service resulted in an early exposure to
politics and an abundance of pontificating on a number of momentous
issues. He ascended to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1784 and
quickly became a leader in the General Assembly. At thirty-three, after
nearly ten years of involvement in Virginia politics, James Madison
helped "define the proper boundaries between church and state in a free
society."'54 Although James Madison is most famous in the lay and legal
communities for becoming the fourth president of the United States and
making a substantial contribution to the Federalist papers,55 his most sig-
nificant legacy is, arguably, his passionate religious liberty rhetoric.
James Madison's zeal for the issue of church-state relations is evident
by his celebrated and enlightened rebuke of Patrick Henry.56 In 1784,
Patrick Henry, an American patriot, statesman, and orator, became con-
cerned over what he and others perceived as the deterioration of moral
conditions.5 7 In an effort to curb this perceived moral spiral, Patrick
Henry, at the time the most popular politician in Virginia, introduced a
bill for the General Assessment of Religion. This Assessment included a
property tax to unilaterally support churches.
The bill ... was specifically for the support of and maintenance of
several Ministers and Teachers of the Gospel who are of different
persuasions and Denominations and for the upkeep of their
churches. In the case of Quakers and Mennonists, which had no
clergy, the money would go in a general fund to promote their partic-
ular mode of worship. In short, Henry's General Assessment was an
eighteenth-century version of what the twentieth-century accom-
53. Id. at 26.
54. Id.
55. Mr. Howard puts the importance of the Federalist papers in perspective: "Of the
eighty-five essays-published in 1788 as The Federalist-Madison wrote twenty-nine. The
Federalist has few competitors as America's single most important contribution to political
theory and to the art of governance." Id. at 29.
56. Patrick Henry is probably most known for his emphatic proclamation at the onset
of the American Revolution, "Give me liberty, or give me death!"
57. Ironically, contemporary figures are calling for religious mandates, such as school
prayer, to curb the perceived rampant moral degeneracy that Patrick Henry, James
Madison, and others believed to be an epidemic over 200 years ago. "James Madison com-
plained... about the 'Poverty... Luxury... Pride... Ignorance ... Knavery ... Vice and
Wickedness' which prevailed in Virginia," yet remained an adamant supporter of religious
liberty. KETCHAM, supra note 48, at 57. Conversely, political commentator, conservative
leader, and two-time presidential candidate Pat Buchannan provides a representative sam-
ple of the sentiments of many current public figures:
Since in the thirty years [we have] taken prayer, Bible instruction, Ten Com-
mandments out, [sic] we've seen crime, violence, rape, attacks on teachers,
killings, stabbings, horrible situations in the school. Don't you see a correla-
tion between the removal of all ethical, moral, and religious instruction from
education and the decline of society?
Crossfire: Prayer & Politics (Cable News Network television broadcast, Nov. 16, 1994,
transcript # 1224) available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File (Pat Buchanan's question
to Bill Bogaman, senior pastor of the Foundry United Methodist Church, on House
Speaker Newt Gingrich's proposal to offer a school prayer amendment for a vote on the
House floor by July 4, 1995).
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modationists believe the First Amendment allows: nonpreferential
and nondiscriminatory government aid to all religions.58
The introduction of Patrick Henry's General Assessment prompted
James Madison to write A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, a document that served as the intellectual genesis and sup-
port for the First Amendment's religious liberty clauses. 59 He vehe-
mently opposed what he considered a governmental entanglement with
religion, exhorting that religion "must be left to the conviction and con-
science of every man" as religious freedom is an "inalienable right."'60
Madison argued that the health of religion is not dependent upon gov-
ernmental support. He feared that such governmental support of religion
would "destroy that moderation and harmony which forbearance of our
laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among its several
sects. '61 His reference to the intermeddlance of secular laws and religion
in the sects is a display of concern over the growing number of edicts with
exclusively religious motives. Religious tests for public office and estab-
lished colonial religions are merely a few examples of what James
Madison considered to be a detrimental entanglement of government and
religion. On numerous occasions, from the beginning of his philosophical
and political career through the twilight of his life, James Madison re-
tained what in modern day analysis is considered a strict separationist
stance:
As an old man he offered the opinion that the separation of church
and state that took place in Virginia immediately after the War was
the best thing that had ever happened to the churches in that state:
"We are teaching the world the great truth that Governments do bet-
ter without Kings and Nobles than with them. The merit will be
doubled by the other lesson that Religion flourishes in greater purity,
without than with the aid of Government. '62
Furthermore, his reference to intermeddlance is an acknowledgment of
the remnant of colonial intolerance that lingered throughout Virginia and
other commonwealths.
He concluded that government's role in the religious arena is limited to
"protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same
equal hand which protects his person and his property; by neither invad-
ing the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of
another. ' 63 James Madison's impassioned opposition to Patrick Henry's
58. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, at 80.
59. Howard, supra note 49, at 26.
60. Id. This statement is analogous to the denotative meaning of religious liberty. See
supra note 10.
61. Howard, supra note 49, at 26.
62. NOLL, supra note 2, at 135. But see infra part IV.D. (discussing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's contrary view of government aid to religion).
63. HOWARD, supra note 49, at 26. Excerpts of A Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments shed more light. on James Madison's response to church-
state relations, keeping in mind that this is a response to a rather simple, uniform request
for religious tax assistance:
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seemingly harmless and unambitious proposal helped lay Henry's bill to
rest and led to the passage of Thomas Jefferson's Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom. 64 Moreover, it personified this Founding Father's be-
lief in the separation of church and state.65
A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments is merely
one example of James Madison's public concern (and in some instances
paranoia) over the ability of the government to influence or control indi-
vidual liberty. For example:
[H]e even opposed the appointment of chaplains to Congress and
the military, calling a chaplainship to Congress "a palpable violation
of equal rights, as well as Constitutional principles." This man who
wrote the First Amendment, vetoed a bill that would have given the
Baptist Church land, saying that it "compromises a precedent for the
appropriation of funds of the United States for the use and support
1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that Reli-
gion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence."
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate....
4. ... Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and
to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot
deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the
evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offense
against God, not against man....
To the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia: A Memorial and
Remonstrance, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 55, 56-57.
64. This Act was written by Thomas Jefferson, introduced into the General Assembly
in 1779, and signed into law on January 19, 1786. Although its author is Thomas Jefferson,
its essence, as the following excerpts demonstrate, belongs to James Madison:
1. WHEREAS Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all at-
tempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens [sic], or by civil
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are
a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion ....
II. Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be com-
pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry what-
soever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened [sic] in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions
or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to main-
tain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
Id. at 60-61.
65. Id. Further light is shed is on James Madison's views by his extensive correspon-
dence with Princeton classmate William Bradford. The correspondence contains some of
James Madison's sentiments on religious liberty and government involvement with
religion:
If the Church of England had been the established and general Religion in
all the Northern Colonies as it has been among us here and uninterrupted
tranquillity had prevailed throughout the Continent, It is clear to me that
slavery and Subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated
among us. Union of Religious Sentiments begets a surprizing [sic] confi-
dence and Ecclesiastical Establishments tend to great ignorance and Corrup-
tion all of which facilitate the Execution of mischievous Projects.
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 47. This letter is one of the many that displayed
James Madison's embedded cynicism of government and religious entanglement.
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of religious societies." 66
Despite James Madison's numerous expressions concerning religious
liberty, his legacy in this area is undoubtedly the First Amendment.
Amazingly, however, the First Amendment can in some respects be con-
sidered a fortuitous part of American society. The Articles of Confedera-
tion, which served as America's precursor to the current United States
Constitution,67 were originally intended to be the living document by
which our country would abide. Nevertheless, the Articles of Confedera-
tion proved to be wanting in several regards. Many of the powers and
liberties that we assume must exist for any democracy (or republic) to
survive were conspicuously absent. For example, there was no executive
branch. Congress had no power to levy taxes on individuals, regulate
commerce, or prevent the states from coining money.68 The Articles of
Confederation failed to establish a national power, including a central-
ized government, and no federal courts were established to override state
laws that conflicted with national legislation. 69 Most importantly, how-
ever, the Articles of Confederation contained no references to religious
liberty.
The glaring deficiencies in this document led to the Philadelphia con-
vention. "Although called merely to draft amendments to the Articles of
Confederation, the Philadelphia convention soon moved to a more ambi-
tious business-the writing of a new constitution. ' 70 The delegates rec-
ognized many of the potentially politically fatal flaws of the Articles and
thus decided to completely discard the document.
Historians agree that "Madison was the dominant spirit of the Philadel-
phia convention. Certainly his influence on the convention was such that
he has been aptly described as the 'master builder of the Constitution. ' ' 71
This is thought-provoking, given the fact that George Washington was
unanimously selected to preside over the convention. At the very least,
however, it correlates with James Madison's abundance of congeniality
and intelligence. On September 17, 1787, after four months of debate, the
delegation discarded the Articles of Confederation and adopted a com-
pletely new document; the current United States Constitution is the same
document (not including the amendments) produced by the 1787 Phila-
delphia convention. It was similar to the Virginia state constitution 72 and
was subsequently ratified by the states in 1788.73
66. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, at 78 (quoting EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR
FATHERS 51 (1987)).
67. The Articles of Confederation were ratified by the states in 1781. J. W. PELATSON,
CORWIN AND PELATSON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 10 (5th ed. 1970).
68. Id. at 11.
69. Howard, supra note 49, at 27.
70. Id. at 28.
71. Id.
72. This was a result of James Madison's influence during the convention. See JAMES,
supra note 47, at 151-58.
73. PELATSON, supra note 67, at 17.
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Unfortunately, our new living document was again bereft of any refer-
ences to church-state relations. Nevertheless, James Madison, elected to
the first House of Representatives and recognizing the need to protect
individual liberties, sought a speedy enactment of the Bill of Rights.74
His first concern was the protection of religious freedom, and he intro-
duced a series of amendments in 1789 that would affect church-state rela-
tions at the federal and state levels. He clearly considered his
amendments restricting the ability of states to control or influence reli-
gious liberty to be the most important.
James Madison's first draft of what would eventually become the First
Amendment was substantially different in language and scope than the
ultimate final product: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on ac-
count of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, abridged. '75 This amendment was rejected by
the congressional committee, which feared that such an amendment
might abolish religion altogether. The committee wanted to inject the
word "national" to make clear that state and local governments would be
free to support religious institutions. Although James Madison explained
that the intended meaning of his proposal was "that Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor to
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience,"
he flatly rejected the contention that governments at any level should be
allowed to support any religious sect or abridge religious liberty. 76
In addition, the states' sovereignty argument played an enormous role
(which, incidentally, turned out to be the Achilles' heel of our country,
leading to the Civil War). For example, "[a]s the House moved from
amendment to amendment it became evident that South Carolina, with
some Northern aid, was intent on subordinating Congress to the states.
[One Carolinian congressman] wanted an amendment assuring the peo-
ple's right 'to instruct their representatives."'' 77
Madison's fifth amendment included a clause that was directed at the
states: "No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience. ... "78 Many
scholars, including biographer Irving Brant, have interpreted this clause
as having the primary goal of removing the vestiges of state establish-
ments.79 Indeed, a natural reading of this clause leads to the logical con-
clusion that its intent was to effect religious liberty at the state level.
In light of the opposition James Madison faced and in spite of his "in-
tention to subject the States to a similar but separate restriction-one
which he called the most valuable in his entire list," the amendment was
74. REICHLEY, supra note 29, at 108.
75. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800 269
(1950).
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id. at 273.
78. REICHLEY, supra note 29, at 108.
79. Id. at 108-09.
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altered to read: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or in-
fringing the rights of conscience."'80 Although this amendment was in
language clearly directed to Congress, appeasing the vocal states' rights
constituency, the committee adopted a substitute a few days later: "Con-
gress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exer-
cise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience."' 81 The final version
of the amendment did not clearly identify the author, and there is no
positive proof that James Madison wrote the final version; nevertheless,
he was the sine qua non of the First Amendment, given the legislative
history and language: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '82
C. THE FAITH OF (OTHER) FOUNDERS
Many religious and political figures link the professed religious convic-
tions of the Founding Fathers with a liberal support of accommodation. 83
As previously stated, most of the Founding Fathers were in rhetoric very
pious men. 84 As Clifford Goldstein explains, "The argument then pro-
ceeds that, because they were Christians, they couldn't have meant for
the Constitution to be hostile to religion .... Rather, the Founding Fa-
thers, because they were Christians, would have been accommodationists,
allowing government to support religion as long is it didn't favor one
church over another. '85 Mr. Goldstein and others, including church-state
scholar Dr. Stan Hastey, have recognized that this argument "has become
common currency among those seeking to use the state either to fund or
to promote religion."'86
Notwithstanding, contemporary contentions that the Founding Fathers
were devout Christians and therefore liberal accommodationists become
nebulous when compared to what the Founding Fathers have publicly
said about religious liberty. For instance, George Washington is often
80. BRANT, supra note 75, at 270.
81. Id. at 271.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., LAHAYE, supra note 6, at xi ("The overwhelming majority of the found-
ing fathers of this nation were raised and believed in the Christian faith").
84. Although the founders were overwhelmingly religious, they were heavily influ-
enced by the Enlightenment. "The Enlightenment taught that divine revelation could not
establish truths that were contrary to reason. To many Enlightenment thinkers, however,
revelation remained an important supplement to reason, and religion and reason thereforeplayed complementary roles in the search for truth." Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Reli-
gions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Religious Traditions in American Politics
and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1993-94) (citing HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN
AMERICA xiv (1976)).
85. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, at 74.
86. Id. Chief Justice William Rehnquist believes that the government is free to pro-
vide nondiscriminatory aid to religious sects, so long as the government does not favor one
sect over another. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




characterized as a devout Christian,87 and although the depth of his (and
many of the early American's) religious beliefs can always be subject to
scrutiny,88 the existence of a prayer book and his many references to God
raise the inference that George Washington was indeed a Christian.
Nevertheless, his public responses to religious liberty clearly places him
in the same vein as James Madison. This became apparent in 1789 when
ranking members of the Presbyterian church complained to the President
that the new Constitution was too secular and failed to recognize "the
only true God and Jesus Christ."'89 George Washington's public response
was that "the path of true piety is so plain as to require but little political
direction." 90 Furthermore, when negotiating a peace treaty with Tripoli,
he included language that sheds a great deal of light on his religious lib-
erty convictions: "[T]he United States is not, in any sense, founded upon
the Christian religion." 91
Other Founding Fathers were publicly, clearly in harmony with George
Washington and James Madison. One example is Benjamin Franklin,
who is often cited in modern day analyses as one who would support the
religious beliefs of Christian conservatives. He has been "baptized" by
many religious figures who refer to him as a strong advocate of "religious
freedom. '92 The contemporary uses of the term "religious freedom,"
however, have evolved over the years and consequently have drifted from
its denotative meaning.93 Christian conservatives have increasingly used
the term "religious freedom" to essentially mean the elimination of
church-state separation.
Although Benjamin Franklin was a firm believer in God, his oft-quoted
pronouncement about religion and government is, to say the least, con-
trary to liberal accommodation and entanglement:
When religion is good, I conceive that it will support itself; and when
it does not support itself, and God does not take care to support it, to
that its professors are obliged to call for the help of civil powers, "tis
a sign, I apprehend, of it being a bad one."'94
87. Pat Robertson, one of the leading public proponents of a wholesale restructuring
of religious liberty in America, contends that George Washington was "a Christian whose
faith in God and respect for God's Word were the central pillars of his public policy." PAT
ROBERTSON, AMERICA'S DATES WITH DESTINY 115 (1986). Says Christian author Tim La-
Haye, "That [he] was a devout believer in Jesus Christ and accepted Him as His Lord and
Savior, is easily demonstrated by a reading of his personal prayer book." LAHAYE, supra
note 6, at 110. Legal historian and religious professor John Eidsmoe has the following
analysis: George Washington's prayers "are the sentiments of an Orthodox Christian."
JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 131 (1987).
88. See supra note 50.
89. GAUSTAD, supra note 66, at 78.
90. Id.
91. Henry S. Commager, Take Care of Me When I am Dead, in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 331.
92. LAHAYE, supra note 6, at 115-16.
93. See supra note 10.
94. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, at 77.
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Of course the famous (or infamous) wall of separation metaphor
originated with Thomas Jefferson. In addition to this polemical meta-
phor, he made numerous other statements that align him with James
Madison, George Washington, and Benjamin Franklin on religious lib-
erty. For instance, he considered any sort of general tax to support reli-
gion "sinful and tyrannical" 95 and proclaimed that "[ilt is error alone
which needs the support of the government. Truth can stand by itself."96
Thomas Jefferson is characterized by John Eidsmoe as a man who "saw
the value of Christianity for the nation and the individual, attended
church, gave to the support of several churches, and lived a pious life."'97
Despite his piety, Thomas Jefferson is much harder to baptize than the
aforementioned Founding Fathers. By most historical accounts, he was a
Deist and a follower of the Enlightenment. 98 Nonetheless, his letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association in response to the proposed First
Amendment was cited by the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds
v. United States:99
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach ac-
tions only and not opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of
separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of
the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has
no natural right in opposition to his social duties. 100
James Madison was clearly, in rhetoric, a staunch supporter of church-
state separation, and his previously discussed views provide a nexus to
the religious liberty views of the aforementioned Founding Fathers. His
position on religious liberty never changed during his lifetime and indeed
became a foundation of the most important amendment in the Bill of
Rights. James Madison, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and
Thomas Jefferson, at varying moments in their political careers, all made
public statements that would place them in direct contrast to modern calls
for liberal accommodation and entanglement.10'
95. An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY, supra note 1, at 60 ("to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical").
96. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 160 (William Peden ed.,
1955).
97. EIDSMOE, supra note 87, at 245.
98. See generally MAY, supra note 84 (discussing the impact of the Enlightenment on
Thomas Jefferson and other Founders).
99. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
100. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
101. Indeed, current public figures proclaim America to be a "Christian nation" and
call for an official pronouncement. See, e.g., Evangelical Update, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
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III. COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
BEFORE LEMON V. KURTZMAN AND SHERBERT V. VERNER
Common law decisions prior to 1947 were inconsistent and in some
instances alarming. State and federal courts had varying interpretations
of religious liberty, and the resulting judicial opinions displayed this lack
of cohesiveness. For instance early blue laws,10 2 although clearly compel-
ling an adherence to a Christian doctrine (Sunday keeping), were almost
uniformly upheld in numerous jurisdictions. Ironically, early blue law de-
cisions, despite being patently unconstitutional, were the only areas of
homogeneous religious liberty jurisprudence in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.
A. BLUE LAW FATALITIES
State v. Fernandez10 3 is an example of a nineteenth century blue law
fatality. Mr. Fernandez was prosecuted for violating the provision of
Louisiana's blue law, which required all places of business to close on
Sunday. Mr. Fernandez dared to open his grocery store on Sunday and
was promptly tried and convicted. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that the ordinance did not compel the observance of Sunday as a religious
institution and hence was not a violation of the State constitution, which
has an establishment clause provision identical to the First Amend-
ment. 104 The court determined that the statute was a valid exercise of the
State's police power. 05
Massachusetts was another of the many states with quasi-establishment
statutes. In Commonwealth v. Has,10 6 Mr. Has was convicted of violating
Massachusetts's Sunday blue law. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that prohibiting the opening of a shop on the "Lord's day"
does not conflict with the eleventh amendment to the constitution of
Massachusetts, which provides that no subordination of any one sect or
denomination to another shall ever be established by law.' 0 7
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of New York declared that an
act prohibiting dramatic performances on Sunday does not infringe on
the right to "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
1992, at 19 (Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice proclaimed that "America is a Christian
nation"); America is not a Christian Nation, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 1992, at
2B (Governor Fordice stating that "[t]he less we emphasize the Christian religion the fur-
ther we fall into the abyss of poor character and chaos in the United States of America").
102. Blue laws are statutes regulating entertainment activities, work, and commerce on
Sundays. These laws have their origin in colonial New England. BLACK'S LAW DICrION-
ARY 157 (5th ed. 1979). Many states, particularly in the northeastern United States, cur-
rently have archaic blue laws on the books. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (discussing the Maryland blue law).
103. State v. Fernandez, 2 So. 233 (La. 1887).
104. Id. at 234.
105. Id.




worship" preserved by New York's constitution.'08 The court explained
that the legislature has the authority to protect the Christian Sabbath
from desecration, by such laws as it may deem necessary, and is the sole
judge of the acts properly to be prohibited with a view to the public peace
on that day.109
In re Kingu1 0 is another example of establishment laws that were in
direct conflict with the First Amendment. The Federal District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee held that the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution had not abrogated the Sunday laws of
the states and established religious freedom. The court explained that the
states were free to, in spite of the First Amendment, establish a church or
creed, maintain them, and still be in harmony with the Constitution.'11
The foregoing cases represent just a few of the many decisions that
sanctioned laws that undoubtedly "respected an establishment of reli-
gion" (Christianity), yet passed constitutional muster according to the ju-
diciary. Keeping Sunday as a holy day was palatable to such large
segments of society during these periods due to the overwhelming
number of professed Christians in the population. Nevertheless, forcing
the entire population of a city or state to observe a religious holiday by
prohibiting merchants from conducting business, or prohibiting any law-
ful activity for that matter, is clearly an infringement of religious liberty.
Despite the disestablishment among the states, lingering vestiges of es-
tablishment practices and statutes, like blue laws, remained a part of
American society. 12
B. JUDICIAL EMBRACEMENT OF CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION AND
THE APPLICATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
In a free exercise case, Judge Schwellenbach of the Eastern District of
Washington departed from the theocratic rationale of early blue law deci-
sions in United States v. Hillyard.113 This case involved Mr. Hillyard who,
after being selected for jury duty, refused to serve as it would violate the
108. Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 N.Y. 557 (1877).
109. Id.
110. 46 F. 905 (W.D. Tenn. 1891).
111. Id. at 915-16.
112. Although the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century enactment of blue laws
had exclusively religious motives, some states maintain these laws under a different guise.
The Supreme Court determined in 1961 that these laws now have a secular purpose. Mc-
Gowan, 366 U.S. at 435-36. Blue laws represent an interesting paradox in this nation's
history. Both Madison and Jefferson introduced blue laws into the Virginia General As-
sembly. Many scholars agree, however, given the highly partisan, religious climate, that
the bills were a carrot stick approach to political compromise on the entire religious liberty
issue. See Robert Alley, The Madison and Jefferson Blues: Madison and Jefferson Once
Supported a Sunday Law. Big Deal, LIBERTY, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 18 (discussing the motiva-
tion behind both bills).
113. United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
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religious tenets of the Jehovah's Witness faith.114 The court held that the
refusal of a Jehovah's Witness to serve as a juror because of a religious
belief is protected by the First Amendment.
Judge Schwellenbach gave a cogent depiction of primigenial American
religious liberty:
The "history of the times" is filled with instances of bigotry, intoler-
ance, reprehension and persecution. The colonists who fled from the
old world to escape religious persecution brought with them none of
the tolerance towards those with whom they disagreed which they
demanded from those from whom they fled. The statute books of
the Colonies were replete with laws by which the majority members
of each Colony attempted to enforce upon others the precepts of the
particular denomination or faith to which the majority adhered.
People were taxed against their will for the support of religion and,
sometimes, for the purposes of particular sects to whose tenets they
could not and did not subscribe. 115
Judge Schwellenbach goes on to extensively cite A Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessment in an attempt to define the pa-
rameters of religious liberty. He captures the essence of the Founding
Fathers' religious liberty philosophy in the following excerpt: "We main-
tain therefore that in matters of religion, no man's right is abridged by the
institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.' 16 Judge Schwellenbach realized that only by either ignor-
ing a substantial amount of statements made by the Founding Fathers or
by taking a revisionist history approach could he prevent Mr. Hillyard's
constitutional right of free exercise of religion. He concluded his opinion
with a common sense analysis:
While I cannot understand defendant's reasoning and cannot accept
his conclusion... I have no fear that the prestige of this court will be
diminished by this result.... Oftentimes a free government can best
demonstrate its strength by frugality in its use. Power need not al-
ways beget force. Only those who need rely on power must always
use it.117
He recognized that his personal disdain for Mr. Hillyard's religious con-
viction should not result in the simplistic conclusion that the practice did
114. The Witnesses teach that the obligations imposed by God are superior to those
enacted by temporal government. They believe that a literal interpretation of Exodus 20:
3-5 prohibits government service.
115. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. at 612. Judge Schwellenbach gave other examples of early
religious liberty deprivations:
Even the "Act of Toleration" of which Maryland so proudly boasts, provided
the death penalty for those who might thrice be convicted of violating the
statute defining blasphemy to be to "deny our Savior to be the Son of God,
or deny the Holy Trinity, or the Godhead of any of the three Persons, or the
Unity of the Godhead."
Id. at 613.
116. Id. See supra note 63 for further excerpts of A Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments.
117. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. at 614.
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not deserve constitutional protection. 118
In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing TP,119 the United States
Supreme Court borrowed the thought process of Judge Schwellenbach by
relying on the historical intent and the convictions of the Founding Fa-
thers when interpreting religious liberty. Everson involved a New Jersey
statute that authorized its local school districts to make rules and con-
tracts for the transportation of children to and from schools. Everson
subsequently filed suit challenging the right of the Board to reimburse
parents of parochial school students. Although the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey upheld the statute and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, the Supreme Court ensured its opinion explicitly laid out
what statutes or actions would be unconstitutional:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor a Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.120
The Supreme Court in Everson, as the Court did in Reynolds, relied on
Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. The Court
explained that "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it
here."1 21
Reynolds and Everson are certainly in direct contrast with the cases
that endorsed religiously oppressive laws. They are evidence of the judi-
cial merry-go-round that engulfed religious liberty during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition to judicial inconsistency
over the interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
courts struggled over the incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states.
C. THE INCORPORATION DEBATE
Scholarly debate over the incorporation of the First Amendment to the
states has been the source of volumes of intellectual discussion. 122 Ini-
118. The Supreme Court formally established the compelling state interest test for Free
Exercise cases in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
119. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
120. Id. at 15-16.
121. Id. at 18.
122. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's Wishing
Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1993); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment
Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of
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tially, the Bill of Rights as a whole was not applied to the states. This was
underscored by Justice John Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore,123 when he
and a plurality of the Court held that the Bill of Rights does not restrain
state and local authorities. Some courts subsequently struggled with in-
corporation, 124 while others, relying on the writings of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison, unilaterally applied the Establishment and Free Ex-
ercise Clauses to the states. 125
The failure of the Supreme Court to address incorporation left the
states with the ability to adopt all, few, or none of the Bill of Rights. The
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly applies to the
states, 126 forced the Court to confront the issue of incorporation. 127 Nev-
ertheless, the Court did not take the momentous step of applying the Bill
of Rights to the states until 1925. In Gitlow v. New York,128 the Court
held that liberty of speech is protected by the word "liberty" in the Four-
teenth Amendment. From that point on the Supreme Court began the
process of "selective incorporation"'129 and "[b]y 1970, for all practical
purposes, the Bill of Rights [had] been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment." 130
Everson was the Court's first explicit incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause to the states.' 3 ' Cantwell v. Connecticut132 officially incorpo-
rated the Free Exercise Clause. Since the landmark decisions of Everson
and Cantwell, there has been little debate over the incorporation of the
First Amendment's religious liberty clauses, and both have subsequently
been applied liberally to the states.133
the Bill of Rights: A Response to Michael Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REV. 1 (1991); Michael K.
Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. (1982).
123. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
124. See discussion supra part III.A.
125. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13 (1947) (citing Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments and Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Dan-
bury Baptist Association); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211
(1948) (citing Thomas Jefferson's Danbury letter).
126. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States ... nor deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor.., equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
127. PELTASON, supra note 67, at 105.
128. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
129. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (explaining the doctrine of selective
incorporation).
130. PELTASON, supra note 67, at 107.
131. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
132. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
133. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-65 (1963) (Brennan, J.,




IV. LEMON, ITS PROGENY, AND THE CONSERVATIVE
JUDICIAL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PARADIGM
As the discussion in Part III exemplifies, there was indeed a need for
judicial cohesiveness, particularly regarding Establishment Clause cases.
Inconsistencies abounded and state legislatures and state and federal
courts appeared destined for a religious liberty quagmire, with the reli-
gious liberty pendulum being subject to the predilections of continually
shifting partisan judicial philosophies. An apparent solution to the Estab-
lishment Clause problem arrived in 1971 with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 34
A. LEMON v. KURTZMAN
The facts behind Lemon originated in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.
Rhode Island's controversy surrounded the State's 1969 Salary Supple-
ment Act. The Act provided for a fifteen percent salary supplement to be
paid to teachers in nonpublic schools at which the average per-pupil ex-
penditure on secular education was below the average in public schools.
Teachers eligible under the Act could only teach courses offered in the
public schools using exclusive public school materials and had to agree
not to teach courses in religion. 135
Although the Act was intended to benefit all qualified teachers regard-
less of their religious faith, Rhode Island religious demographics resulted
in a disproportionate number of Catholic teachers receiving a benefit. At
the time of the Act's passage about twenty-five percent of the State's
elementary school students attended private schools, about ninety-five
percent of whom attended schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic
church. Consequently, about 250 teachers at these Roman Catholic
schools were the sole beneficiaries under the Act. Critics charged that,
given the control and influence of the Catholic church over the State's
parochial schools, this system fostered an excessive entanglement of the
Catholic church and state government.
Pennsylvania's controversy surrounded its Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1968. This Act authorized the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction to purchase secular educational services
from private schools and directly reimburse those schools solely for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. Although the
reimbursement was expressly forbidden for any course involving any reli-
gious teaching, the schools involved were, as in Rhode Island, almost ex-
clusively Roman Catholic. Critics of the Pennsylvania statute argued that
despite the statute's provisions the Catholic church controlled the State's
parochial schools and had a primary objective of advancing its religious
beliefs.
134. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
135. Dicenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 114 (D. R.I. 1970).
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As was the case with many prior religious liberty cases, the lower
courts arrived at somewhat confused decisions. A three-judge panel in-
validated the Rhode Island Act, reasoning that the school system was "an
integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church" and hence
fostered "excessive entanglement" between government and religion. 136
Conversely, a judicial panel, considering a closely analogous claim,
granted a motion to dismiss the claim involving the Pennsylvania Act,
finding no violation of the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses.'
37
The lower court made this finding despite the Catholic church having es-
sentially the same influence and control over the private school systems
of both states.
The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, found that both
statutes involved an excessive entanglement of government and religion
and were thus unconstitutional. The Court found a problem with the
Rhode Island Act due to the exclusive religious purpose and influence of
the Catholic church and other church-affiliated (or controlled) schools.
A teacher under the control of religious institutions, the Court reasoned,
posed a danger to the separation of religious from purely secular aspects
of elementary education in those schools. 138 States would subsequently
have to provide continuing supervision of the private schools to ensure
compliance with the statutory provisions as well as the religious liberty
guarantees of the First Amendment. In the event a nonpublic school's
expenditures per pupil exceeded the comparable figures for public
schools, this supervision would further include inspection of school
records to determine what part of the expenditures are attributable to
secular education as opposed to religious activity.
Restrictions and state supervision provided the rationale for a finding
of entanglement in the Court's invalidation of the Pennsylvania program
as well. Under the Act, the State had to ensure that teachers performed a
strictly non-ideological role and the state supervision of private school
accounting procedures were required to establish the cost of secular as
distinguished from religious education. The Court found a further defect
in the Pennsylvania statute, as it provided continuing financial aid directly
to the church-related schools.139 Historically, the Court explained, gov-
ernmental control and surveillance measures tend to follow cash grant
programs, and here the government's post-audit power to inspect the fi-
nancial records of church-related schools creates an intimate and continu-
ing relationship between church and state. 140
Chief Justice Burger, along with a plurality of the Court, decided that a
common law nexus was required for analyzing Establishment Clause
cases. Justice Burger explained that "every analysis in this area must be-
136. Id. at 123.
137. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
138. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-20.




gin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years.' 141 He then brought together recent Supreme Court
decisions to develop what became known as the Lemon test. First, any
statute or governmental action substantially affecting religious liberty
must have a secular legislative purpose.142 Second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion.1 43 Third, the stat-
ute or action must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.' a
Despite its secular mandate, the first prong of the Lemon test does not
prohibit laws that have a religious as well as a secular purpose. 145 "A
religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate ... a ... [statute]....
The religious purpose must predominate."'' 46 Any other interpretation
would make the entire test hostile to religion in general. 147
The second prong requires courts to determine whether the govern-
ment is engaged in favoring, endorsing, or inhibiting "particular religious
beliefs and the degree to which this action might harm religious or irrelig-
ious minorities. '148 Hence, a statute that establishes Good Friday (an
exclusively Christian holy day) as a federal or state holiday to primarily
honor the death of Christ would likely have the primary effect of advanc-
ing the Christian faith. 149 Conversely, a statute that targets a particular
religious faith or the tenet of a religious faith would have the primary
effect of inhibiting religion.
Lemon's third prong is best exemplified by the facts of Lemon itself.
The supervision required by the State over religious institutions, coupled
with the influence of the Catholic church over the parochial school sys-
tem, required the State to intermeddle in the affairs of the Catholic
church. Similarly, the Catholic church exerted an unwarranted degree of
influence over state employees. The type of reciprocal involvement in
the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania instances are prima facie excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.
Since the landmark decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Lemon test
has monitored church-state relations with judicial decisions that appeased
141. Id. at 612.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
144. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
145. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590, 593 (1987) (a law with a predom-
inately religious purpose and primary objective of advancing a particular religious faith
violated the first prong of the Lemon test).
146. Id. at 599.
147. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984) ("Were the test that the
government must have 'exclusively secular' objectives, much of the conduct and legislation
this Court has approved in the past would have been invalidated.").
148. Daniel 0. Conkle, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman: Lemon
Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 870 (1993). The second "prong asks whether, irre-
spective of the government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
149. See Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (holding that state
recognition of Good Friday as a state holiday in Illinois violates the Establishment Clause).
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and antagonized both separationists and accommodationists. °50 Some
have argued that the Lemon test is hostile toward religion, 151 while others
view it as judicial syllogism.15 2 Nevertheless, despite the Supreme
Court's own acknowledgment of the delicate complexity of religious lib-
erty,153 the Lemon test has provided a consistent (albeit controversial)
theme for courts and legislatures to follow. 154
B. LYNCH V. DONNELLY: THE CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL DICHOTOMY
Notwithstanding the judicial road map provided by the Court in
Lemon, subsequent opinions have essentially followed the "party line."
Liberal jurists generally take a strict separationist approach, staunchly ad-
hering to the wall of separation metaphor, while conservative members of
the judiciary despise dogmatic interpretations of church-state separation
and favor liberal accommodation of religion.
The composition of the Supreme Court in the years immediately fol-
lowing Lemon was ostensibly liberal. Consequently, religious liberty de-
cisions, for the most part, closely adhered to a strict interpretation of the
wall of separation.'5 5 The changing political scene of the 1980s, however,
resulted in the evolution of a conservative Supreme Court and an accom-
panying conservative judicial philosophy. 5 6
150. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama stat-
ute providing for a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" in public
schools as the statute's purpose endorsed religion) and Levitt v. Commissioner for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479 (1973) (declaring unconstitutional a state
statute that allowed reimbursement to church-sponsored schools for the costs of complying
with various testing and reporting requirements) with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (upholding a
city's inclusion of a creche (Nativity scene) in a broader Christmas display) and Roemer v.
Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding non-categorical grants to church-
sponsored colleges and universities).
151. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 85 (Burger, J., dissenting) (criticizing the invalidation
of a moment of silence statute as indicating hostility toward religion).
152. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 148, at 867 (Professor Conkle views the Lemon test
as an attempt "to protect the sensibilities of religious and irreligious minorities ... [and]
promote a religiously inclusive political community, not by mindlessly excluding religion
from American public life, but rather by a context-specific, case-by-case analysis of particu-
lar problems").
153. As the Court explained in Lemon, "[T]he line of separation, far from being a
'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
154. Lemon has been heavily criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper,
The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools: An Update, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 5
(1987); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Estab-
lishment, 59 CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 S. CT. REV. 1; Phillip A. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PiTr. L. REV. 673 (1980).
155. See supra note 153.
156. President Reagan's Supreme Court appointments in the 1980s of Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, and Kennedy, coupled with holdover Justice White and President Reagan's
naming of holdover Justice Rehnquist as Chief Justice, gave the Court a solid conservative
bloc. Presidents Reagan and Bush attempted to ensure that their judicial appointees held
strict conservative views on social issues, including church-state separation. SMITH, supra
note 15, at 13.
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Lynch v. Donnelly 57 personifies the stark differences between liberal
and conservative approaches to religious liberty. Ironically, the facts of
Lynch arose in Rhode Island, the birthplace of Lemon. Each year the
city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in conjunction with the downtown retail
merchants' association, erects a Christmas display to commemorate the
Christmas season. The display is set up in a park owned by a nonprofit
organization in the heart of the shopping district (although all compo-
nents of the display are owned by the City of Pawtucket). It includes,
among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh,
candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures represent-
ing such characters as a clown, an elephant, hundreds of colored lights,
and, of course, the creche. 158 The creche has been included in the display
for more than forty years. It consists of traditional Christian figures, in-
cluding baby Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and
animals.
Members of the Pawtucket community filed suit to stop the use of the
creche. The district court agreed with the community members and held
that by including the creche in the display, the City "tried to endorse and
promulgate religious beliefs" and that "erection of the creche has the real
and substantial effect of affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that
the creche represents.' '159 The district court further reasoned that the dis-
play resulted in an "appearance of official sponsorship" and "confers
more than a remote and incidental benefit on Christianity.' 60 A divided
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding.161
Chief Justice Burger, however, writing for a conservative majority,
found no First Amendment violation and reversed the decision of the
lower courts.' 62 His analysis is very similar to the analysis of dissenting
liberal Justice Brennan, yet the outcomes of each are in direct contrast.
For example, Justice Burger begins his opinion by searching for an appro-
priate precedent to use when analyzing this case.' 63 Although he ac-
knowledges the wall of separation metaphor and refers to Lemon early in
his opinion, he establishes his ideology as clearly supporting a loose inter-
pretation of church-state separation.
In fact, Justice Burger characterizes Thomas Jefferson's entire concept
of a wall of separation as "a useful figure of speech."'1 64 He further criti-
cizes the wall of separation metaphor as being "not a wholly accurate
description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists
157. 465 U.S. 668 (1983).
158. Id. at 669.
159. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1173 (D. R.I. 1981).
160. Id. at 1178.
161. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
162. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
163. Justice Burger, recognizing this as an Establishment Clause case, explains that the
purpose of this portion of the First Amendment is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intru-
sion of either [the church or the state] into precincts of the other." Id. at 672, (quoting
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
164. Id. at 673.
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between church and state. ' 165 He concludes his ideological entrench-
ment by stating that "[i]t has never been thought either possible or desir-
able to enforce a regime of total separation .... ,166
Attempting to find precedent for the decision in Lynch, the Court held
its judicial nose and halfheartedly embraced Lemon. Justice Burger cited
the elements of the Lemon test, yet qualified his reference by stating that
"we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion in this sensitive area. ' 167 Consequently, rather
than relying exclusively on the Lemon test, Justice Burger attempted to
find historical support from the Founding Fathers as precedent for accom-
modating the use of Pawtucket's religious symbol.
A few of the historical references used by the Chief Justice are the
employment of Congressional chaplains to offer prayer at the First Con-
gress,168 the use of God on our currency and as a part of the Pledge of
Allegiance, 169 and art galleries that display religious artwork with the
support of public funds.170 Chief Justice Burger concludes his historical
analysis by citing former Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, "The real
object of the First Amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesias-
tical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive pa-
tronage of the national government. '1 71
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 760 (1973)).
167. Id. at 679. Justice Burger cites three cases where he contends the Court did not
apply the Lemon test, considering it irrelevant: Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78
(1971); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773; and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
168. As the Chief Justice explains, Congress welcomed the use of Congressional
chaplains:
It is clear that neither the seventeen draftsmen of the Constitution who were
Members of the First Congress, nor the Congress of 1789, saw any establish-
ment problem in the employment of Congressional chaplains to offer daily
prayers in the Congress, a practice that has continued for nearly two centu-
ries. It would be difficult to identify a more striking example of the accom-
modation of religious belief intended by the Framers.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674. But see supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing James
Madison's opposition to Congressional chaplains).
169. Chief Justice Burger explains why he relies on God invocations and the Pledge of
Allegiance:
Other examples of reference to our religious heritage are found in the statu-
torily prescribed national motto 'In God We Trust,' 36 U.S.C. § 186, which
Congress and the President mandated for our currency ... and in the lan-
guage 'One nation under God,' as part of the Pledge of Allegiance to the
American flag. That pledge is recited by thousands of public school chil-
dren-and adults-every year.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
170. Id. at 676-77 ("Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paint-
ings of the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith. The
National Gallery in Washington, maintained with Government support, for example, has
long exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably the Last Supper.").
171. Id. at 678 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 728 (1833)). It must be noted, however, that despite being one of the most
influential Supreme Court Justices in the early United States, Justice Story's views on
church-state separation can not be reconciled with the views of James Madison and other
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Chief Justice Burger then turns to the central issue in Lynch:
"[W]hether there is a secular purpose for Pawtucket's display of the
creche. '' 172 He determines that Christmas is a traditional American holi-
day with ample secular aspects and that Pawtucket is merely attempting
"to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday. 1' 73
Chief Justice Burger concludes that the totality of the display is secular
and that the creche merely happens to "coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of" the Christian celebration of the birth of Jesus, but stops short
of establishing, advancing, or favoring Christianity. 174
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's outcome in Lynch; how-
ever, she takes a far more conciliatory approach to Lemon and in fact
applies the Lemon test in her analysis. 175 She concludes, nonetheless,
that the "[c]elebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance
even if they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular pur-
pose.' 76 She further reasons that the Christmas "holiday itself has very
strong secular components and traditions" and that "[tihe creche is a
traditional symbol of the holiday that is very commonly displayed along
with purely secular symbols, as it was in Pawtucket."' 77
Justice Brennan begins his dissent in the same manner as Justice Bur-
ger: searching for an appropriate stare decisis to help develop his opin-
ion. Contrary to Justice Burger's devaluation of the Lemon test,
however, Justice Brennan has little problem embracing and relying on
Lemon as an appropriate precedent for Establishment Clause cases. 178
He further admonishes the Chief Justice and the majority for refuting the
Lemon test and cites as authority the very cases that Justice Burger
claims ignored the Lemon test.
previously discussed Founding Fathers. For instance, Justice Story believed Christianity,
not religion in general, must be the fostered religion of the United States:
The promulgation of the great doctrines of religion ... never can be a matter
of indifference to any well ordered community. It is, indeed, difficult to con-
ceive, how any civilized society can well exist without them. And at all
events, it is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of Christianity, as a
divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of government to foster,
and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects.
STORY, supra, at 699 (emphasis added). But see supra text accompanying note 94 (quoting
Benjamin Franklin's views on religion receiving encouragement from the state). It is puz-
zling that James Madison appointed Justice Story to the Supreme Court given their diamet-
rically opposed religious liberty views. Nevertheless, it is similar to ideological "mistakes"
made by presidents throughout history. For instance, conservative President Richard
Nixon unknowingly appointed liberal Justice Harry Blackmun. Simiarly, conservative
President George Bush unknowingly appointed moderate Justice David Souter.
172. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 682.
175. Id. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 691.
177. Id. at 692.
178. As Justice Brennan explains, "This well-defined three-part test expresses the es-
sential concerns animating the Establishment Clause .... [Tihe test is designed to ensure
that the organs of government remain strictly separate and apart from religious affairs, for
a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion."
Id. at 698 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
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Justice Brennan insists that the Lemon test has been a "fundamental
tool of Establishment Clause analysis. '179 He goes on to explain that Ny-
quist, one of the decisions Justice Burger claims did not use the Lemon
test, in fact referred to the Lemon test as mandatory precedent by saying
that "[t]aken together, [our] decisions dictate that to pass muster under
the Establishment Clause the law in question [must satisfy the three ele-
ments of the Lemon test]." 180
He further refutes the majority's use of Larson, explaining that the
Court in Larson "first reviewed a state law granting a denominational
preference under a 'strict scrutiny' analysis . . .181 but then concluded by
finding the statute unconstitutional under the Lemon analysis as well."'182
Justice Brennan further argues that Chief Justice Burger himself em-
braced the Lemon test during the prior term (1982): "This Court has
consistently held that a statute must satisfy three criteria [as set forth in
Lemon] to pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 18 3
After lecturing the majority for its disregard of the Lemon test, Justice
Brennan then looks to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution in
light of the religious accommodation enunciated by Justice Burger. Jus-
tice Brennan acknowledges that the Court has, on a number of occasions,
allowed public expressions of religion, such as the instances cited by Jus-
tice Burger. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan complains that in each in-
stance cited by the majority, a "historical inquiry to the particular
practice under review" was conducted by the Court, something the ma-
jority in Lynch failed to do.1s4
Justice Brennan further criticized the majority's reliance on the em-
ployment of chaplains to Congress by exposing the history behind the
practice:
[I]n Marsh v. Chambers, after marshalling the historical evidence
which indicated that the First Congress had authorized the appoint-
ment of paid chaplains for its own proceedings only three days
before it reached agreement on the final wording of the Bill of
Rights, the Court concluded on the basis of this 'unique history' that
the modern-day practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer
was constitutional.1 8 5
He further explains the "In God We Trust" national motto and the ref-
erences to God in the Pledge of Allegiance as merely forms of "ceremo-
nial deism."'1 86 These phrases are protected from the Establishment
Clause primarily because rote repetition has diminished the significance
179. Id. at 697 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772-73).
181. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-51.
182. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 n.2 (citing Larson, 456 U.S. at 251-55).
183. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (Burger, C.J.).
184. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 716 (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964)(reviewing WILBUR G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1993))).
1996] 1609
SMU LAW REVIEW
of their religious connotations. 8 7 "Moreover, these references are
uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing pub-
lic occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in
a manner that simply could not be fully served in our culture if govern-
ment were limited to purely non-religious phrases.' 88 Justice Brennan
concludes that these historical religious references are "probably neces-
sary to serve certain secular functions, and that necessity, coupled with
their long history, gives those practices an essentially secular mean-
ing."'189 He believes that the majority purposefully avoided delving into
the American origins of the Christmas celebration as there is no compa-
rable record of its widespread acceptance of nativity scenes.' 90 In fact, as
Justice Brennan points out, the public colonial Christmas celebration met
with considerable hostility and did not gain widespread acceptance in
America for a number of years. 191
Justice Brennan explains that colonists, particularly Puritans, were
staunchly opposed to any public commemoration of Christmas. They and
many other colonists viewed it as embracing a Roman Catholic doctrine
that lacked Biblical foundation. "The Puritans, and later the Presbyteri-
ans, Baptists, and Methodists, generally associated the celebration of
Christmas with the elaborate and, in their view, sacrilegious celebration
of the holiday by the Church of England and also with, for them, the
more sinister theology of 'Popery.""u 92 Unlike the primigenial chaplain,
currency, and Pledge of Allegiance examples, Christmas was not granted
legal recognition as a public holiday until 1836. Congress did not follow
suit until 1870, when it designated December 25th, July 4th, January 1st,
and November 25th as legal holidays.' 93
Justice Brennan further disagrees with the majority's benign depiction
of the creche. He reasons that the purpose of the creche is to effect an
awe in viewers of one of the material aspects of Christianity: "that God
sent His son into the world to be a Messiah.' 94 He concludes that a
creche consequently plays no secular role, is bereft of historical public
support, and hence is an unconstitutional advancement of the Christian
religion. 195
Although the Court's decision in Lynch is essentially constitutionally
harmless, the rationales used by the majority and dissenting opinions re-
veal the stark differences between conservative and liberal church-state
judicial ideology. Justice Burger's opinion, as a representative conserva-
tive opinion, is genuinely patriotic and recognizes the important role reli-
187. Id.
188. Id. at 717.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 719-20.
191. Id. at 721.
192. Id. at 722.
193. Id. at 723.
194. Id. at 711.
195. Id. at 724-26.
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gion played and continues to play in the history and development of the
United States. Unfortunately, he uses a somewhat revisionist rationale
by skirting historical analysis of public nativity scenes.
Additionally, Justice Burger's invocation of Justice Story reveals the
origins of conservative judicial philosophy in this area of law. Justice
Story, nugatory disclaimers notwithstanding, was clearly hostile to
church-state separation. Like Justice Story, Justice Burger not only rec-
ognized the importance of religion in society but also displayed a willing-
ness to promote Christianity in the American public arena.
Conversely, Justice Brennan's representative liberal opinion personi-
fies the concern-and in some instances paranoia-of the Founding Fa-
thers regarding church-state separation. Justice Brennan correctly
exposes the patent message of a nativity scene. A depiction of the birth
of baby Jesus clearly has no (even remotely) secular purpose. Nonethe-
less, Justice Brennan becomes overly concerned with the potential harm
to potential religious minorities. Just as the appearance of "In God We
Trust" and "One Nation Under God" have lost their religious signifi-
cance, so too have nativity scenes-blended with contemporary, commer-
cialized, public Christmas celebrations-probably lost their substantive
promotion of Christianity.
The common ground in this and many church-state judicial decisions is
reciprocal capitulation. Justice Burger' 96 must acknowledge stare decisis,
namely the Lemon test, and the clearly Christian purpose of a creche.
His attempted disavowal of the Lemon test and other cases that have
relied on this test creates the appearance of judicial manipulation.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan's fierce defense of religious minori-
ties must at times soften to accommodate theoretically harmful acts that
in reality cause negligible damage. For example, the Pawtucket nativity
scene, although clearly a promotion of Christianity, causes very little
harm when placed beside the mythical, secular, and non-biblical Santa
and his flying reindeer. Moreover, the government's attempt to promote
this exclusively Christian belief (the birth of Jesus as the Messiah) was
essentially rendered a nullity by placing the creche amid the other secular
displays.
C. THE SCALIA PARADOX AND CONSERVATIVE CONTEMPT
FOR METAPHORS
No justice personifies the highly partisan judicial debate over religious
liberty better than Justice Scalia. His written, contemptuous expressions
for the wall of separation and the Lemon test are legion, 197 and his reli-
196. The use of Justice Burger, Justice Brennan, and a creche in this context is intended
to serve as a metaphor for conservative and liberal judicial ideology as it impacts church-
state separation.
197. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398 (1993), rev'd, 17 F.3d 1425 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
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gious liberty philosophy places him in step with Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Story. Justice Scalia's religious liberty opinions, particularly his
dissenting opinions, are often harsh, irreverent, and condescending.
1. Lee v. Weisman
Lee v. Weisman198 provides a paradigmatical opinion of Justice Scalia.
Weisman revolved around public school prayer. Mr. Weisman filed suit
on behalf of his daughter Deborah, a fourteen-year-old ninth grade stu-
dent. Deborah graduated from the Nathan Bishop Middle School, a pub-
lic school in (ironically) Providence, Rhode Island. Each year Nathan
Bishop brought in preachers to give a state-sponsored invocation and
benediction during the graduation ceremony. Providence school officials
provided invited clergy with a pamphlet entitled Guidelines for Civic Oc-
casions, written by the National Conference of Christians and Jews.
Mr. Weisman sued the school, seeking a permanent injunction against
the school's practice, asserting that the government-sponsored prayers vi-
olated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Kennedy, affirmed the decisions of the district court 99
and First Circuit Court of Appeals,200  declaring the practice
unconstitutional.201
In reaching this decision, Justice Kennedy refused to reconsider
Lemon, as the school and solicitor general urged, yet failed to explicitly
apply the elements of the Lemon test.202 Justice Kennedy did, nonethe-
less, display a great deal of concern for the protection of religious minori-
ties, particularly young children, from coercion. He determined that
coercion of dissenting students in the present context could occur in two
ways. First, a student might object to a state-sponsored prayer, believing
"that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience
will not allow. o203 Second, a student's conscience may compel her to re-
frain from all aspects of the prayer, including standing to "maintain re-
spectful silence. ' '2°4
again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free
School District.").
198. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
199. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D. R.I. 1990).
200. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990).
201. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 599.
202. Id. at 587. Although the majority opinion did not expressly apply the elements of
the Lemon test after its refusal to overturn Lemon, the majority in effect applied the first
and third elements of the test in its analysis. See Conkle, supra note 148, at 874-76 (Profes-
sor Conkle asserts that Justice Kennedy implicitly applied the Lemon test). But see
Michael S. Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman: Lemon is
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) (refuting Professor Conkle's observation).
203. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
204. Id. Justice Kennedy found voluntary prayer in the middle or public school context
to be a misnomer. Id. at 592. He explained that a government-controlled religious exer-
cise "puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance
that religious faith is real, not imposed." Id. Justice Kennedy further stated:
The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern world as in
the 18th Century when it was written. One timeless lesson is that if citizens
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Justice Scalia vehemently dissented from the majority in Weisman. His
fiery dissent characterizes Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and other
religious liberty decisions that differ with his own views as an "embarrass-
ment,"20 5 "incoherent," 20 6 "ludicrous," 20 7 "absurd," 20 8 "psycho-jour-
ney," 20 9 "lamentable,"210 "senseless," 211 "jurisprudential disaster. '212
He begins his dissent by rightfully criticizing the majority for its failure to
ground its opinion in closely analogous historical fact.213 Notwithstand-
ing this criticism, in fairness to Justice Kennedy, the Court had never
before decided a case involving a middle school. The Court did, however,
have the previously decided public school precedent to use in its rationale
by analogy.214
Justice Scalia continues his spirited dissent by delving into an historical
excursion of the many instances where prayer has been and currently is
an integral part of secular society. He points to a number of instances
where religion and prayer have been "prominent part[s] of governmental
are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its
own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief
which is the mark of a free people. To compromise that principle today
would be to deny our own tradition and forfeit our standing to urge others to
secure the protections of that tradition for themselves.
Id.
205. Id. at 636 (quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("I find it a sufficient embarrassment that our Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence regarding holiday displays . . . has come to 'requir[e]
scrutiny more commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary."').
206. Id. ("The Court's argument that state officials have 'coerced' students to take part
in the invocation and benediction at graduation ceremonies is ... incoherent.").
207. Id. at 637 ("The Court's notion that a student who simply sits in 'respectful silence'
during the invocation and benediction (when all others are standing) has somehow
joined-or would somehow be perceived as having joined-in the prayers is nothing short
of ludicrous.").
208. Id. at 638 ("It is fanciful enough to say that 'a reasonable dissenter,' standing head
erect in a class of bowed heads, 'could believe that the group exercise signified her own
participation or approval of it[.]' . . . It is beyond the absurd to say that she could entertain
such a belief while pointedly declining to rise.").
209. Id. at 642 ("But whatever the merit of [the Court's prior school prayer cases], they
do not support, much less compel, the Court's psycho-journey.").
210. Id. at 644 ("The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially
ignoring it . . . and the interment of that case may be the one happy byproduct of the
Court's otherwise lamentable decision.").
211. Id. at 646 ("To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in order
to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even
sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law.").
212. Id. at 644 ("Another happy aspect of the case is that it is only a jurisprudential
disaster and not a practical one.").
213. Id. at 631. While it is true that the majority opinion provides a scanty historical
analysis, the concurrence of Justice Souter is grounded in history, exclusively devoted to
exposing the religious climate surrounding the First Amendment, the intention of the
Founding Fathers regarding religious liberty, and relating the original intent of the Fathers
to the decision by the majority. Id. at 609-31 (Souter, J., concurring).
214. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that government-controlled
prayer in public schools is unconstitutional); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that government-controlled Bible reading exercises in public
schools are unconstitutional).
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ceremonies and proclamations. '215 Included in his examples are religious
references in the Declaration of Independence,216 presidential inaugural
addresses that included prayer,217 national prayer days,218 and prayer as a
part of legislative and judicial events.219 He concludes his historical jour-
ney by citing evidence of prayer in the public school setting dating back
to 1868.220
The crux of his opposition to the majority decision revolves around his
belief that prayer is so ingrained in American secular society that any
inconvenience caused by a graduation prayer is a necessary evil and that
there is absolutely no coercion involved in such an exercise. 221 He be-
lieves that peer pressure to participate in middle school graduation exer-
cises is "absurd" 222 and that the possibility that a child may be too
intimidated to excuse herself from the invocation or benediction is
"ludicrous." 223
215. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. The Declaration of Independence "'appeal[ed] to the Supreme Judge of the world
for the rectitude of our intentions' and avowed 'a firm reliance on the protection of divine
Providence."' Id.
217. Justice Scalia explains that George Washington "deliberately" prayed as one of his
first official acts as President:
[lIt would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official act my fervent
supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who pre-
sides in the councils of nations, and whose providential aids can supply every
human defect, that His benediction may consecrate to the liberties and hap-
piness of the people of the United States a Government instituted by them-
selves for these essential purposes.
Id. at 633 (quoting INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 2
(1989)). Justice Scalia additionally notes the (Deist) prayer of Thomas Jefferson during his
inaugural address: "[M]ay that Infinite Power which rules the destinies of the universe
lead our councils to what is best, and give them a favorable issue for your peace and pros-
perity." Id. at 634 (quoting INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 17).
He further refers to the first inaugural address of James Madison, who placed his trust
in the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regu-
lates the destiny of nations, whose blessings have been so conspicuously dis-
pensed to this rising Republic, and to whom we are bound to address our
devout gratitude for the past, as well as our fervent supplications and best
hopes for the future.
Id. (quoting INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 27). Justice Scalia
concludes by making reference to the inauguration of President George Bush, who asked
those attending to bow their heads as he made prayer his first official presidential act. Id.
218. Justice Scalia further points to our annual celebration of Thanksgiving, which was
proclaimed a national day of thanksgiving and prayer by George Washington and nearly
every president since: "President Washington proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of
thanksgiving to 'offe[r] our prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Na-
tions, and beseech him to pardon our national and other transgressions ....... Id. at 635
(citing J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 1789-1897 64 (1899)).
219. A chaplain's prayer has opened every Congressional session since the First Con-
gress. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1983)). And, the Supreme
Court has, since the days of Chief Justice Marshall, opened its sessions with the invocation
"God save this United States and this Honorable Court." Id. (citing C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 469 (1922)).
220. Id. at 635.
221. Id. at 637.
222. See supra note 208.
223. See supra note 207.
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After scourging the majority for what he essentially characterizes as an
un-American, "jurisprudential disaster,"22 4 Justice Scalia turns his con-
tempt to what he refers to as the "so-called" Lemon test.2 25 He con-
demns the Lemon test as a "formulaic abstraction[ ]" that conflicts with
"our long-accepted constitutional traditions. '22 6 He further berates
Lemon as irrelevant.2 27
Justice Scalia concludes his analysis by generally acknowledging and
then ignoring the rights of religious minorities in favor of majority rule
religious traditions. In his eyes, the issue is not whether the minority
needs protection from the majority. "Rather, the question is whether a
mandatory choice in favor of the former has been imposed by the United
States Constitution. '2 28 Justice Scalia prefers to abandon the Lemon test
and rest every Establishment Clause case on American tradition, regard-
less of the interests of religious minorities.229 He concludes that the "age-
old practices of our people" (the American public prayer tradition) is
embodied in the Constitution and hence trumps the harm or "inconven-
ience" to religious minorities. 230
Justice Scalia went through a painfully copious historical study of the
American tradition of embracing prayer in secular environments. His
opinion reflects the sentiments of a devout Christian who cherishes the
vital role religion plays in our society.231
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia displays an alarming lack of sensitivity to
the protection of religious minorities from the tyranny of religious major-
224. See supra note 212.
225. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. Justice Scalia explains that the "so-called" Lemon test has been criticized by
many (conservative) members of the Supreme Court over the years. See, e.g., County of
Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy,
J.); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting): Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S.
736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
227. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Contrary to Justice Scalia's con-
tention of irrelevancy, Justice Blackmun points out that, as of 1992, "[s]ince 1971, the
Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one instance, the decision of
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), has the Court not rested its decision on the basic
principles described in Lemon." Weisman, 505 U.S. at 603 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In fact, two recent prominent religious liberty decisions expressly relied on the Lemon test.
Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Metzl v.
Leininger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
228. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2515 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The foremost principle I would apply [in place of Lemon] is fidelity to the long-standing
traditions of our people, which ... [would not] leave us to our own devices."). The glaring
deficiency in Justice Scalia's position is that very few religious minorities have practices
steeped in historical tradition. See infra note 247.
230. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646.
231. Justice Scalia has on various occasions quoted Biblical scripture as a part of his
judicial opinions. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2242 n.6 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 n.1 (1991). For further insight on
Justice Scalia, see generally SMiTH, supra note 15, detailing the life and judicial philosophy
of Justice Scalia; see also infra notes 361-63 and accompany text (discussing Justice Scalia's
frank, public discussions of Christianity).
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ities. Moreover, his apparent bias in favor of popular tradition does not
take into account how wrongheaded the tradition may or may not be. To
reach his conclusion Justice Scalia had to deny the obvious: Government
controlled religious exercises, where children are the primary partici-
pants, pose patent entanglement problems. The coercion aspect aside,
government-controlled religious exercises that involve children have no
secular purpose, clearly advance a particular religion (mostly the Protes-
tant form of Christianity), and involve the excessive entanglement of gov-
ernment officials supervising or in fact controlling a religious exercise.
2. The Smith Debacle
No case personifies Justice Scalia's capacity for callous indifference to
the protection of religious minorities more than Employment Division
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.2 32 Smith centered around the
religious practices of Alfred Smith, a seventy-year-old Klamath Indian
and member of the Native American Church. Mr. Smith, a former alco-
holic, went to work for the Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Preven-
tion (ADAPT) in Oregon during the 1970s. He signed an adhesion
contract contemporaneous with his hiring that included a clause prohibit-
ing the use of alcohol or narcotics. He mistakenly believed his contract
exempted the ritual use of peyote.233
Unfortunately for Mr. Smith and Galen Black, a fellow Native Ameri-
can co-worker, the ADAPT contract did not contain any exemptions for
ritual peyote use (although ADAPT has since changed its policy), and
both were subsequently fired. Upon application for unemployment bene-
fits, the Oregon Employment Division denied the claims of both men,
asserting that they were discharged for work-related misconduct. On ap-
peal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Employ-
ment Division. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that,
although sacramental peyote use indeed violated state drug laws, the pro-
hibition in the contract violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
232. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
233. Peyote is a type of cactus called mescal, found in Mexico and the southwestern
United States. It contains button-like tubercles that are dried and chewed as an hallucina-
tory drug. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (5th ed. 1979). Peyote use by Native Ameri-
cans, which can be traced back more than 1400 years, has long been a part of Native
American culture:
Indians use dried peyote buttons to assuage hunger, thirst, and fatigue during
hard work, to detect the approach of an enemy, and to predict the outcome
of a battle. They wore it to ward off disease and danger. Shamans used
peyote in the curing process. Many tribes use peyote ritually to dispel anxi-
ety and despair and to assist in the search for visions. In the twentieth cen-
tury peyote became the focus of the Native American Church.
ARRELL M. GIBSON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 47 (1980); see
also JAMES ADAIR, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 448 (1930) (further ex-
panding on historical peyote use among Native Americans); Douglas Laycock, Free Exer-
cise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 886-87 (1994)(explaining the religious importance of peyote use and validating its ancient use).
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Justice Scalia's famous (or infamous) opinion jolted the legal, legisla-
tive, and lay communities. It begins with an oversimplification of Mr.
Smith and Mr. Black's constitutional claim by asserting that the issue in
Smith is merely one of compliance with a generally applicable law.235 He
grounds his decision on the principle of Reynolds v. United States, 236
which states that permitting an individual to violate a neutral law of gen-
eral applicability would allow anyone to place his or her religious beliefs
above the law "and in effect... permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. '237 Justice Scalia subsequently concludes that Oregon's drug
laws are neutral, apply impartially to the entire Oregon population, and
are not targeted at sacramental peyote use. Hence, Reynolds controls the
central issue in the case.238
However flawed the reasoning of Justice Scalia in his initial conclusion
(it contains no historical analysis of Native American peyote use or the
Free Exercise Clause), it was not the cause of public outcry. To the con-
trary, his departure from the strict scrutiny standard established by Sher-
bert v. Verner,239 a case that controlled free exercise cases since 1963, was
the portion of his opinion that resulted in a unilateral (most conservative
Supreme Court justices excluded) denunciation.2 40 Justice Scalia be-
lieved the twenty-seven-year-old compelling state interest test was not a
234. Smith had an interesting path to its final disposition in the United States Supreme
Court. In the first case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, applying a strict scrutiny standard of
review, reversed the decision of the Employment Division. Smith v. Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources, 709 P.2d 246 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). And, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445 (Or.
1985). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently remanded to
the Oregon Supreme Court to determine the "legality of religious use of peyote in Ore-
gon." Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 480 U.S. 916 (1987). On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that Oregon law did not exempt sacra-
mental peyote use, which constituted a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Smith v.
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988). The United
States Supreme Court again granted certiorari to decide whether the ritual use of peyote is
protected by the United States Constitution. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
235. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
236. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
237. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67). Oddly, Justice Scalia
twice cites Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) for support of his conten-
tion that valid and neutral laws of general applicability trump religious convictions, without
mentioning that Gobitis was subsequently overruled three years later by West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
238. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. Justice Scalia further asserts that there is no precedent to
support a "conscientious opposition" to an otherwise neutral, constitutional law. Id.
239. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert test requires government acts that substantially
burden a religious practice be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 402-
03.
240. Many religious, political, and special interest groups publicly opposed the major-
ity's elimination of the strict scrutiny standard for free exercise cases. Included among
them were the liberal ACLU and People for the American Way, the conservative Ruther-
ford Institute, the interdenominational National Council of Churches, the American Mus-
lim Council, and the National Council of Jewish Women. See Ruth Marcus, Reins on
Religious Freedom? Broad Coalition Protests Impact of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1991, at Al.
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sound approach because it was contrary to established precedent and
"contradict[ed] both constitutional tradition and common sense. '241
Justice Scalia provides an additional rationale for rejecting the strict
scrutiny standard by claiming that it would force judges to determine
when prohibited conduct is central to an individual's religion. He consid-
ers it inappropriate for judges to evaluate claims in- this manner. 242
Justice Scalia then summarizes his overruling of Sherbert by contending
that the compelling state interest test "court[s] anarchy" and is therefore
detrimental to the existence of any society.2 43 He insists that forcing gov-
ernments to show a compelling state interest would, potentially, raise the
prospect of jeopardizing compulsory military service, the payment of
taxes, compulsory vaccinations, drug laws, and social welfare legislation,
all in the name of religion.2 4 He reasons that these potential problems
could result from continual application of the Sherbert test (despite
twenty-seven years to the contrary) and concludes that unilateral reli-
gious liberty strict scrutiny analyses is a luxury "we cannot afford. ' 245 He
acknowledges that his reasoning and decision places religious minorities
at a disadvantage, yet believes that this is an "unavoidable consequence
of a democratic government. '246
Justice Scalia's traditional pietistical judicial reasoning was un-
characteristically absent in Smith; however, it was characteristically indif-
ferent to the protection of religious minorities. 247 What makes Justice
Scalia's opinion appear so callous is his markedly different approach to
essentially the same type of problem that he faced in Weisman. Admit-
tedly, the issue in Weisman revolved around the Establishment Clause,
juxtaposed to the Free Exercise Clause of Smith. Still, both cases involve
a governmental attempt to "deprive society of [an] important unifying
mechanism": 248 prayer in American society and sacramental peyote use
in Native American society. Hence, one of the enigmas of Justice Scalia's
opinion is that it does not contain one scintilla of historical analysis of
Native American Church traditions or the Free Exercise Clause.
This approach in Smith appears disingenuous, given Justice Scalia's em-
phatic defense of government-controlled prayer. He went through great
pains in Weisman to authenticate the American secular prayer tradition
241. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
242. Id. at 886-87.
243. Id. at 888 ("[a]ny society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy").
244. Id. at 888-89.
245. Id. at 888.
246. Id. at 890.
247. Minority faiths are generally the only groups that need legislative or judicial pro-
tection. Such groups lack the numbers, finances, voting blocs, and mainstream orthodoxy
that attract or compel political protection; majority faiths have the aforementioned factors
and consequently the accompanying political influence or protection and rarely need gov-
ernmental protection. As Professor Kathleen Sullivan points out, "[N]ot a single religious
exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from a mainstream Christian reli-
gious practitioner." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 195, 216 (1992).
248. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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by tracing prayer in secular environments from our country's inception to
contemporary practices. Nevertheless, his unfound reasoning in Smith249
does not attempt to broach the plethora of information available on Na-
tive American customs. 250 Justice Scalia could have easily discovered
that peyote use among Native Americans and by the Native American
Church is deeply rooted in Indian tradition and is not a whimsical at-
tempt to circumvent necessary drug laws. It is undoubtedly as much a
part of Native American society as public prayer is to the United States
citizenry.
In addition, Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith is exclusively secular. He
not only avoids discussion of the Native American Church, he avoids dis-
cussion of religion altogether. This approach was necessary, however, to
reach the ultimate conclusion in Smith. Justice Scalia could not sympa-
thetically consider the religiosity of the constitutional claims in Smith (as
he did in Weisman) or quote the writings of James Madison or Thomas
Jefferson (as he likewise did in Weisman) while simultaneously quashing
the claims and dismissing the compelling state interest test. Whatever his
motivation, Justice Scalia's dissent in Weisman and his opinion in Smith
appear biased-in favor of traditional Christian practices in Weisman and
against traditional Native American religious practices in Smith. He ap-
pears to have fallen prey to the double-minded 251 judicial reasoning he
complained about in Weisman. His approach to religious liberty appears
to turn on the size and denomination of the religious practice or faith in
question. 252 Such judicial reasoning is not consistent with the idealistic,
unbiased religious liberty climate desired by the Founding Fathers.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia succinctly and eloquently stated in Weisman,
"[O]ur Nation's protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot
possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of the Jus-
tices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic prac-
tices of our people. '253
249. Despite curiously concurring with the outcome in Smith, Justice O'Connor dis-
agrees with the reasoning of Justice Scalia. She asserts that his opinion "dramatically de-
parts from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence ... and is incompatible with our
Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty." Smith, 494 U.S. at 891
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She further claims that "[t]he compelling interest test reflects
the First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible
in a pluralistic society. For the Court to deem this command a 'luxury,' is to denigrate
'[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights."' Id. at 903. Justice Blackmun offered similar criti-
cism in his dissenting opinion, "Until today, I thought [the compelling state interest test]
was a settled and inviolate principle of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The
majority, however, perfunctorily dismisses it as a 'constitutional anomaly . . . by mis-
characterizing this Court's precedents." Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250. See supra note 233.
251. See James 1:8 (a double-minded man is unstable in all his ways).
252. In fairness to Justice Scalia, he supported the religious liberty claim of the rela-
tively small Satmar Hasidic Jewish group in Kiryas, 114 S. Ct. at 2505-16 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing), although the cynic could argue that Justice Scalia's dissent was a no confidence vote
for the Lemon test, rather than an attempt to protect the Satmar group.
253. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Smith was, simply put, a bad decision.2 54 The resulting public outcry
was followed by a series of detrimental religious liberty decisions.2 55
Moreover, the legislative response to Smith was swift. Groups spanning
the entire religious and political spectrum formed a coalition, lobbied
Congress, and were rewarded with the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA).2 56
The RFRA, which had enormous bipartisan support in both the House
and Senate, restored the compelling interest test of Sherbert.257 A cross-
section of leaders from liberal and conservative religious and public pol-
icy groups to law professors testified before the House and Senate Com-
mittees considering the RFRA. Oliver S. Thomas, who appeared on
behalf of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, provided a representative statement of public
opinion concerning the implications of Smith: "Since Smith was decided,
governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over religious con-
viction. Churches have been zoned even out of commercial areas. Jews
have been subjected to autopsies in violation of their families faith. In
time, every religion in America will suffer. ' '2 58 In fact, there was a near
unanimous sentiment (save Senator Jesse Helms and two other Senators
who voted against the bill) in the Senate that Justice Scalia's opinion was
contrary to the very essence of the Bill of Rights.2 59
254. Indeed, Smith was an embarrassing, incoherent, ludicrous, absurd, lamentable,
senseless, jurisprudential disaster. See supra notes 205-212 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (after Smith, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, relied
on state instead of federal constitutional grounds to quash the Amish defendants' free
exercise right not to display fluorescent emblems on their horse-drawn buggies); Saint Bar-
tholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (relying heavily on
Smith, the Second Circuit applied land marking ordinances to church-owned buildings);
Ryan v. United States Dept. of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
958 (1992) (citing Smith, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
dismissal of an employee whose religious beliefs compelled him not to investigate two paci-
fist groups); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D. R.I. 1990) (reversing an earlier decision
upholding Hmong religious objection to an autopsy, in light of Smith).
256. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
257. The purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) are as follows:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guar-
antee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substan-
tially burdened; and(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercises is sub-
stantially burdened by government.
Id.
258. S. REP No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Oliver S. Thomas testifying before
the Senate Judiciary Committee).
259. The Senate Judiciary Committee explains that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is
to place minorities beyond the reach of majorities' political whims or controversies. "Ones
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections." Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638). See generally Laycock,
supra note 233, for further analysis of the RFRA. The RFRA has to date been on an
interesting excursion through the federal courts. Compare Belgard v. State, 883 F. Supp.
510 (D. Haw. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of the RFRA as a valid enforcement
of Congress's powers under the 14th Amendment) and State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573
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D. MORE CONSERVATIVE CONTEMPT FOR METAPHORS
Justice Scalia is not alone in his, at times, revisionary religious liberty
philosophy. Chief Justice Rehnquist is also hostile to strict judicial em-
bracement of the wall of separation concept. Rehnquist has expressed
contempt for the wall of separation metaphor, which he dismisses as a
minor afterthought of Thomas Jefferson. 260 He further discounts Thomas
Jefferson's "misleading metaphor" as merely a "short note of courtesy,
written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress."'261
Justice Rehnquist concludes that Thomas Jefferson's presence in
France during the passage of the Bill of Rights and its ratification by the
States renders him irrelevant to any determination of the legislative in-
tent behind the First Amendment's religious liberty clauses.262 Although
he acknowledges James Madison as the primary architect of the First
Amendment, he erroneously characterizes Madison as an accommoda-
tionist whose only fear was the establishment of a national religion.263
Justice Rehnquist, like Justice Burger before him,264 invokes the reli-
gious liberty rationale of Justice Story as a basis for beginning his analysis
of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 265 Hence, his reasoning
leads to the conclusion that government neutrality is not required in the
religious arena and that the federal government may provide nondiscrim-
inatory, nonpreferential aid to religion.266 He reaches this conclusion by
proclaiming that "[t]here is simply no historical foundation for the propo-
sition that the Framers intended to build [a] 'wall of separation"' between
church and state.267
Furthermore, he considers the Lemon test bad law because it is based
on a false reading of history.268 He echoes the sentiments of Justice
Scalia, explaining that the Lemon test is "useless" and "should be frankly
and explicitly abandoned. '269 He fails, however, to offer a workable solu-
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (agreeing with and adopting the holding of Belgard) with Flores v.
City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding the RFRA violates separation
of powers and is hence unconstitutional), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
260. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id. But see Donald E. Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First
Amendment, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 681,692 (1989) (Justice "Rehnquist's revisionist notions rep-
resent the outgrowth of an equally revisionist reading of history").
263. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see supra notes 75-81
and accompanying text (discussing James Madison's attempt to enact a constitutional
amendment affecting religious liberty at the state level).
264. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
265. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 106 ("As its history abundantly shows ... nothing in the Establishment
Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does
that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through
nondiscriminatory sectarian means."). But see supra text accompanying note 120; Douglas
Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 875 (1986).
267. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 110.
269. Id. at 107.
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tion that would not quash the rights of religious minorities. Moreover,
his philosophy on nonpreferential government support for religion con-
tains a fatal flaw: For the government to support any effort, it must have
revenues, namely, tax dollars from individuals who may be opposed to
supporting religions other than their own. This is precisely what Thomas
Jefferson's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom prohibited.270
By selectively accepting the rationale of Justice Story, selectively dis-
carding the separatist views of Thomas Jefferson, and selectively embrac-
ing accommodationist references of James Madison, Justice Rehnquist
falls prey to the very criticism he leveled in Wallace. Specifically, he em-
braces the errors of Justice Story and engages in revisionist history with
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, without heeding his own admoni-
tion that "no amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions
can make the errors true."'271
V. CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM AND ITS IMPACT
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
"What Christians have got to do is take back this country, one precinct
at a time, one neighborhood at a time, and one state at a time. I honestly
believe that in my lifetime we will see a country once again governed by
Christians ...and Christian values. ''272 The foregoing statement by
Ralph Reed, executive director of the Christian Coalition, epitomizes the
current religious activist movement in the United States.
A ground swell of activist religious involvement in social and political
issues occurred during the latter part of the 1980s and the early 1990s.
The Christian Coalition, one of a number of religious activist organiza-
tions, have immersed themselves in the political process and in turn
placed themselves in the middle of the constitutional religious liberty de-
bate. The overwhelming majority of this activity is centered in what has
been labeled the "Religious Right. ' 273 Although the group prefers to be
270. An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 95, at 61 (["n]o man shall
be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatsoever").
271. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
272. Russell Chandler, Robertson Moves to Fill Christian Right Vacuum: His New
Grass-Roots Coalition Starts With a Donor Base of 1.8 Million Households From His Presi-
dential Campaign, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 15, 1990, at A5.
273. The religious right has been vilified by many individuals, groups, and large seg-
ments of the media. See, e.g., Hypocrisy Runs Rampant Among Religious Right, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 30, 1995, at 31A (criticizing the political agenda of the Christian
conservative movement); Witold J. Walczak, Lets Get the Facts Straight Before Tinkering
with the Constitution, PrrTSBURGH POsT-GAzETTE, Jan. 20, 1995, at C2 (discussing "the
radical right's agenda for a broad constitutional amendment on religious rights"); 'Radical
Religious Right' Is Not the Same as Christian, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 1994, at 6(objecting to the Christian conservative effort to ignite political Christian activism); Frank
Rich, Mainstream Jews Should Join Specter's Stand Against Radical Religious Right, SUN-
SENTINEL (FORT LAUDERDALE), July 8, 1994, at 16A (discussing Republican Senator Ar-
len Specter's criticism of the "religious right"); Clifford Rhodes, Religious Right Taking




called "Christian conservatives" and claims to be nonpartisan, most, if
not all, of its constituents are members of and support the Republican
party.274
A. THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVE AcrIvIsM
Despite recent activist trends, American religious organizations have a
long history of activism. Early on, deeply embedded religious traditions
that arrived with the first American settlers from Europe resulted in the-
ocratic governments in the colonies. 275 Although socialized religion
eventually dissipated, individual religious involvement flourished during
the early nineteenth century.
This period, from approximately 1700 to 1750, became known as the
Great Awakening.276 The Great Awakening witnessed a rapid-and to
this point-unparalleled increase in religious conversions that touched
nearly every region and aspect of life in the colonies. 277 Additionally, it
legitimized the use of heretofore eschewed terms, including "'liberty,'
'virtue' and 'tyranny' in public discussion" and in turn laid the ground-
work for the American Revolution.278
The onset of the American Revolution, however, brought the Great
Awakening to a screeching halt. The war disrupted religious develop-
ment, and attacks on socialized religion caused a great deal of skepticism
about Christianity.279 The result was an American congregational popu-
lation of well under ten percent by the late eighteenth century, with some
frontier areas being bereft of all vestiges of Christian influence. 2 0
The end of the American Revolution and socialized religion spurred a
second religious movement, the Second Great Awakening. This move-
ment, from approximately 1795 to 1810, "was the most influential revival
of Christianity in the history of the United States."281 This religious ren-
aissance was accompanied by Christian-based activism. For instance, ab-
olitionists (most of them Christian) vehemently and publicly opposed
274. See generally RALPH REED, POLITICALLY INCORRECT: THE EMERGING FAITH
FACTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1994) (describing the intimate relationship between
Christian conservatives and the Republican party). Although this Comment focuses on the
Christian Coalition, this group represents merely one of a number of Christian conserva-
tive activist organizations that can be considered members of the religious right. The
Christian Coalition is the most visible and possibly the largest group in the Christian con-
servative movement. See, e.g., DAVID CANTOR, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: THE ASSAULT ON
TOLERANCE & PLURALISM IN AMERICA 75-142 (Alan M. Schwartz ed., 1994) (giving de-
tailed descriptions of Christian conservative organizations around the country).
275. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
276. See generally MARK A. NOLL, ET AL., THE SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA 48-
69 (1989) (discussing the Great Awakening in detail).
277. Id. at 50-51. In New England, which has the most copious historical church
records, the average number of Congregational converts from 1730 to 1740 was eight per
year. During the height of the Great Awakening in 1741 and 1742, however, the average
grew to 33 per year. Id. at 51-52.
278. Id. at 55.





slavery, and women, under the guise of religion, became increasingly in-
volved in a number of social issues. Mostly in the name of religion, Sarah
and Angelina Grimke were fierce opponents of slavery; Dorthea Dix ad-
vocated improved treatment of the mentally ill; Catherine Beecher
sought educational rights for women; and many others were active in the
prohibition movement. 282
The Civil War, like the American Revolution, disrupted religious
growth and organized religious activism. In addition, emancipation of the
slaves removed a unifying element among religious activists. Neverthe-
less, the Second Great Awakening left a "permanent legacy. '283 Lyman
Beecher, one of the key figures from the Second Great Awakening, was
instrumental in developing organizations that were designed to prosely-
tize America and cure social ills.284 Beecher's efforts and influence re-
sulted in the founding of the American Board for Foreign Missions in
1810; the American Bible Society in 1816; the Colonization Society for
Liberated Slaves in 1817; the American Sunday School Union in 1824; the
American Education Society; and the American Society for the Promo-
tion of Temperance in 1826, to name a few. 285 "Such agencies gave the
Second Awakening a long-lived institutional influence" and served as the
genesis for future religious organization and activism. 286
B. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MORAL MAJORITY
Religious activists were essentially politically dormant during the latter
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. There were
no nationwide polarizing issues, such as slavery, to cause any widespread
religious involvement in the social or political arenas. This quickly
changed, however, during the 1960s and early 1970s with the civil rights
movement, legalized abortion, feminism, relaxed sexual codes, increased
drug use, pornography, and an expanding federal government. 287 Many
conservatives considered these developments to be an assault on the
moral fabric of American society and, as sociologist James Davison
Hunter explains, organized to "make history 'right' again. ' 288
The rapid organization that followed the Second Great Awakening was
duplicated during the latter 1970s in response to the foregoing social and
political changes. Many conservative political and religious organizations
were formed in 1978 and 1979 (many with intertwined political and reli-
gious missions), including the National Christian Action Coalition, the
Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, and the Moral Majority, Inc.,
headed by Jerry Falwell. 289
282. Id. at 184.




287. CANTOR, supra note 274, at 59.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 60.
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Falwell's Moral Majority became the most notorious of organizations
formed in the 1970s. Falwell believed America was "a nation losing its
moral values"2 90 and attributed much of this perceived moral decay to
church-state separation.2 91 Although he (in rhetoric) abhorred Christian
political activism prior to the inception of the Moral Majority,2 92 he
quickly became a political activist during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
urging a revival of socialized religion, using the Moral Majority as his
bully pulpit.293
He wanted to maintain the Moral Majority as an "ecumenical body of
political activists. '2 94 The focus of this body was national political elec-
tions and national legislation. Indeed, the Moral Majority was able to
register approximately two million voters in 1980, help elect Ronald Rea-
gan, and play an instrumental role in the defeat of the Equal Rights
Amendment.2 95
Unfortunately for Falwell, his staunch support of national conservative
political candidates did not translate into a national advancement of
Christian conservative values, including an attack on church-state separa-
tion. Professor Stephen Carter explains that this national emphasis
proved to be the Moral Majority's fatal flaw:
The error was to press at once into to the maelstrom of national poli-
tics, where every utterance of every candidate that the Moral Major-
ity supported was subjected to intensive scrutiny for evidence of
religious belief leaking into the public square. The result, after a
while, was that [the] Moral Majority became so controversial that its
endorsement was the kiss of death.... Falwell was enticed into coali-
tions with national candidates who spoke the language of his move-
ment but had little true interest in his issues. [For example], neither
President Reagan nor President Bush, for all of their courting of the
Christian right in their rhetoric, ever made a serious effort to press
290. Id. at 61.
291. As Jerry Falwell proclaimed in a March 1993 sermon:
Modem U.S. Supreme Courts have raped the Constitution and raped the
Christian faith and raped the churches by misinterpreting what the Founders
had in mind in the First Amendment of the Constitution ... [Wie must fight
against those radical minorities who are trying to remove God from our text-
books, Christ from our nation. We must never allow our children to forget
that this is a Christian nation. We must take back what is rightfully ours.
Id. at 4 (quoting Jerry Falwell).
292. On March 21, 1965, the day Martin Luther King began the march from Selma to
Montgomery, Alabama, Falwell expressly proclaimed his objection to political activism in a
sermon to the 15,000 members of his Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia:
"Nowhere are we commissioned to reform the externals.... Believing the Bible as I do, I
would find it impossible to stop preaching the pure saving gospel of Jesus Christ, and begin
doing anything else-including fighting Communism or participating in civil rights re-
forms." Id. at 61.
293. Falwell's conversion from political pacifist to activist is evidenced by the following
proclamation: "I hope I live to see the day when, as in the early days of our country, we
won't have any public schools. The churches will have taken them over again and Chris-
tians will be running them. What a happy day that will be!" Id. at 6 (quoting JERRY
FALWELL, AMERICA CAN BE SAVED (1979)).




for school prayer or a ban on abortion in all circumstances. 296
In essence, the Moral Majority, massive voter registration notwithstand-
ing, never developed at the grassroots level. This failure, coupled with
the lack of national support, led to the demise and eventual dissolvement
of the Moral Majority in 1989.297
C. THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT: BORN AGAIN
The Moral Majority, as the foregoing discussion explains, failed to ef-
fect any substantive change in constitutional church-state separation.
Nonetheless, it displayed the enormous potential of organized religious
groups, particularly Christian conservatives. Prior to the demise of the
Moral Majority, fundamentalist leaders began to realize the power of a
conservative religious and political coalition. Following the 1978 elec-
tions, Pat Robertson, referring to the rising Christian conservative move-
ment, boldly proclaimed that "[Christian conservatives] have enough
votes to run the country. ' '298
Robertson emerged from the ruins of the Moral Majority to become a
highly successful entrepreneur and religious activist.299 He formed the
Christian Coalition after his failed 1988 presidential bid to "give focus
and direction to the tens of thousands of Christians who had entered poli-
tics for the first time during [his] campaign with a hope of ensuring a
better future for themselves and their families. '300 It has subsequently
grown at an amazing rate since its inception in the fall of 1989. For exam-
ple, in 1993 it added ten thousand new donors a month and had organiza-
tions in every state, with approximately 860 chapters across the
country. 30 1 By 1994, the Coalition claimed more than 900,000 members,
870 chapters, an additional 350,000 activist member mailing list, and a
budget of between twelve and fourteen million dollars. 30 2
Unlike its Moral Majority predecessor, the Christian Coalition focuses
its efforts primarily at state and local school boards. It sponsors many
school board candidates while simultaneously avoiding political spot-
lights. This is an official policy of the Christian Coalition as evidenced by
the Pennsylvania chapter, which attempted to "become directly involved
in the local Republican committee" in 1992, yet admonished its members
296. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 265 (1993).
297. Laura Sessions Stepp, Falwell Says Moral Majority to Be Dissolved, WASH. POST,
June 12, 1989 at All.
298. REICHLEY, supra note 29, at 320.
299. For example, in 1993 his Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) claimed $140 mil-
lion in revenue, $91 million in contributions, $15 million in overhead, and spent $15.5 mil-
lion on fundraising. John Taylor, Pat Robertson's God, Inc., ESOUIRE, Nov. 1994, at 76.
His Regent University claimed a 1993 endowment of $154 million and his International
Family Entertainment (IFE) company claimed 1993 revenues of $208 million. Id. He
holds 3.1 million shares of IFE stock worth $50 million, and his IFE salary alone is
$435,000. Id.
300. ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE, supra note 18, at 61.
301. Id. at 62.
302. CANTOR, supra note 274, at 27.
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and candidates to "never mention the name Christian Coalition in Re-
publican circles. '303 These tactics resulted in Christian Coalition backed
candidates being dubbed "stealth candidates. '30 4
The enormous growth and intense activism of the Christian Coalition
has immense implications in elections characterized by low voter turnout.
Unfortunately, voter turnout in the United States is among the lowest of
any democratic society.30 5 As Robertson aptly notes, presidential elec-
tions generally reek of voter apathy, with scarcely fifty percent of regis-
tered voters participating. 30 6 Non-presidential year gubernatorial and all
congressional elections have an average voter turnout of forty percent. 307
School board races are especially dismal, with the numbers falling to be-
tween eight and ten percent. 308
Such extreme voter apathy means that fairly minuscule segments of eli-
gible voters decide elections at every level, particularly at the grassroots
level. Robertson is well aware of the implications of American voter apa-
thy and explains that "the combined strength of dedicated Evangelicals
coupled with equally dedicated pro-family Roman Catholics and Ortho-
dox Jews is more than sufficient to decide any election for any office in
the land. '309
Robertson's observation is not an overstatement. There are many ex-
amples of the ability of the Christian Coalition to affect grassroots elec-
tions. Specifically, Christian Coalition backed candidates won fifty-seven
percent of the 1993 school board races they entered in New York City
and four out of five seats in a 1993 Idaho school board election. 31) Chris-
tian conservatives also took over a number of school boards across the
country, including Lake County and Jacksonville, Florida; Round Rock,
Texas; and Vista, California, to name a few. 311
Notwithstanding continuing successes in school board races, the 1990
senatorial re-election bid of Senator Jesse Helms personifies the power of
the Christian Coalition and organized voting blocs in general. Senator
Helms was trailing Charlotte mayor Harvey Gantt by approximately
eight percentage points two weeks before the election during this North
303. Id. at 32.
304. Stealth candidates are individuals who run for public office without fully disclosing
their religious beliefs or affiliations with Christian conservative activist organizations. See
Ken Moritsugu, Bulwark Against 'Stealth Candidates,' NEWSDAY, May 2, 1994, at A20;
Michael D'Antonio, Bedeviling the GOP: With 'Stealth' Candidates, Tight Discipline &
Cash, The Religious Right Dominated the Republican Agenda, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov.
29, 1992, at 26.
305. John Lichfield, U.S. Election Day: Bigger Turnout Lifts Democrats, INDEPENDENT,
Nov. 4, 1992, at 10 (other than Switzerland, the United States has "the worst voting record
in the industrialized world").
306. ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE, supra note 18, at 62.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 63.
310. Id. at 10-11.
311. Deborah Sharp, A Culture Clash Divides Florida County: Schools Told to Say
USA is Superior, USA TODAY, May 18, 1994, at IlA.
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Carolina campaign. Senator Helms called on the Christian Coalition for
help (and subsequently ran racially charged commercials). The Coalition
responded two weeks before the election by mobilizing its forces and dis-
tributing 750,000 church bulletins, referred to as "voter guides," listing
the candidates' positions on controversial issues, including abortion and
school prayer. Their efforts resulted in a dramatic come-from-behind win
by Senator Helms.312 The "combined strength" of the Christian Coalition
has caused it to become a "principle agent of the turning political tide in
America. "313
D. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY LAW FIRMS
Coupled with the Christian conservative race to the polls is the emer-
gence of law firms that specialize in religious liberty litigation. First
Amendment jurisprudence, once the domain of liberal groups like the
American Civil Liberties Union and People for the American Way, is
now deluged by Christian conservative groups waging battles in courts for
greater religious accommodation. These nonprofit organizations are
staffed with hundreds of lawyers who believe that religious freedoms are
under attack.
Robertson formed the most prominent of these organizations, the
American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) in 1990 "to stop the
ACLU, secular humanists, and anti-family organizations that are destroy-
ing [Christians'] freedoms. '314 The ACLJ provides out-of-court legal
services to individuals and primarily educational institutions and is en-
gaged in religious liberty litigation at all levels. 315 In addition, it unam-
biguously opposes strict interpretations of church-state separation.
Indeed, Keith Fournier, its executive director, likens the existing wall of
separation to the Berlin Wall and has called for an end to church-state
separation as it currently exists.316 Many Christian conservative groups
312. ROBERTSON, THE NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 18, at 260.
313. ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE, supra note 18, at 62-63. Mr. Robertson gives a
telling example of how organized, grassroots groups can control elections:
In a school board race in a city with a population of 500,000, there may be
250,000 registered voters, but only 20,000 will vote. This means that 11,000
people out of 500,000 will be sufficient to elect one or more school board
members. In a state with 6 million residents in a hotly contested race for
governor, about 1.6 million people will vote. This means that 801,000 people,
or 13.5 percent of the total population will elect the governor. However, in a
closely contested, statewide race, any determined, cohesive voter block of 10
percent, or even 5 percent, of those voting can swing an election. So in this
hypothetical gubernatorial race, 80,000 to 160,000 people could easily swing
an election from Democratic to Republican or vice versa.
Id.
314. CANTOR, supra note 274, at 47.
315. Id. ACLJ lead counsel Jay Sekulow has successfully argued two high profile
United States Supreme Court cases since coming to the ACL. Bray v. Alexandria, 506
U.S. 263, 286 (1993) (holding the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 does not give federal courts
jurisdiction over abortion protests); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396 (1993) (unanimously holding religious groups must be allowed
access to public school facilities after-hours if non-religious groups are given access).
316. In 1992, Keith Fournier proclaimed:
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and individuals have followed the lead of the Christian Coalition and the
ACLJ by calling for a return to socialized religion.317
E. A MOMENT OF SILENT ... REFLECrION?
The Christian conservative movement is undoubtedly becoming a force
in American politics at all levels. This fact was recognized by Ralph Reed
when he threatened to withhold support for the 1996 GOP presidential
ticket if any member of the ticket holds pro-abortion views.318 He claims
his "word of caution" is a reminder to the GOP that Christian conserva-
tives "are the ones who burn the shoe leather in the precincts." 319
GOP controlled state legislatures have recognized this ongoing power
shift in their party and have undertaken issues that Christian conserva-
tives consider vitally important, among them, school prayer. One result
has been a movement at the state level to introduce legislation allowing
moments of silence in public schools. Undoubtedly, Christian conserva-
tives anticipate court challenges to these statutes and welcome the oppor-
tunity to try and alter current church-state relations.
Georgia's moment of silence statute was the first since Wallace v. Jaf-
free to test the judiciary's vacillating school prayer philosophy. The case
revolves around Brian Bown, a Georgia high school teacher, who was
fired for disobeying the state law that requires teachers of public schools
to start each day with not more than sixty seconds of silence.320 He was
fired after a two-day school board hearing that he branded a "political
trial. ' 321 Mr. Bown considers the statute an unconstitutional attempt to
In no uncertain terms the Court must hear the words which express the pent
up sentiments of Americans throughout this wonderful country-the same
words President Reagan used but in a different context [in Berlin]-Tear
Down This Wall! Let our children pray again and our preachers preach
again ... Let the establishment clause once again prevent what it was in-
tended to prevent, the coercion to belief in one government sanctioned sect.
And let the freedoms of speech, assembly, press and religion again protect
religious speech.
CANTOR, supra note 274, at 48. Similar proclamations have been issued by Pat Robertson,
who calls the wall of separation a "lie of the left." Id. at 4.
317. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION: WHAT IS THE CORRECT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE? (1992) (attempting to establish that
church-state separation is a myth and that the Founding Fathers intended America to be a
Christian nation). Other religious liberty law firms include the Rutherford Institute,
founded by John Whitehead in 1982-15 staff attorneys and over 1000 volunteer attorneys;
the American Family Association Law Center, founded by Donald Wildmon in 1990-5
staff attorneys and over 400 volunteer attorneys; and the Alliance Defense Fund, founded
by Bill Bright in 1993-2 staff attorneys. Julia McCord, Defending Religious Rights Non-
profit Christian Law Organizations Gain Ground Christian Legal Groups, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Apr. 29, 1995, at 57SF.
318. Mimi Hall, Gingrich Wants Shift on Foster: Abortion Too Divisive He Tells GOP,
USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1995, at 8A.
319. Id.
320. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (Supp. 1995) ("In each public classroom, the teacher
in charge shall, at the opening of school upon every school day, conduct a brief period of
quiet reflection for not more than 60 seconds with the participation of all pupils therein
assembled.").
321. Teacher Fired Over 'Moment of Silence,' USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 1994, at 4A.
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bring prayer back into public schools. He subsequently filed an unsuc-
cessful suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the
statute. 322
Mr. Bown questioned the intent of the Georgia legislature during an
appearance on the Cable News Network's (CNN) Crossfire.323 He
claimed that the statute is a covert method of circumventing the First
Amendment's religious liberty clauses.324 Consequently, he refused to
act in a manner that he considered unconstitutional and contrary to his
conscience. 325
The statute in its original form did in fact call for school prayer. It
currently mandates "a brief period of quiet reflection;" however, a prior
version and the initial draft of the current law called for "a brief period of
silent prayer or meditation. '326 In fact, as the district court noted in its
opinion, a transcript of the debate indicated that several House members
viewed this legislation as an opportunity to return prayer to public
schools. 327
Nevertheless, the court concluded that these statements did not indi-
cate the genuine intent of the legislature. The court instead relied on
Senator Scott, the legislation's sponsor, who stated "that the Act was 'not
an effort to bring prayer back into the schools,' but 'was one of three bills
[he] introduced to deal with the violence among our young people.' ' 328
Relying exclusively on the Lemon test, the court then, in a well-reasoned
opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the statute.329
322. Bown v. Gwinett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
323. Crossfire: Sounds of Silence (Cable News Network television broadcast, Aug. 30,
1994) (transcript # 1168), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
324. Mr. Bown asserts that the genuine intent of the Georgia legislature is evident by
statements made during floor debates:
Let's ... talk about the intent of the Georgia legislature when they were
debating this. You know, I can read from a list of the comments they made
where they talked about this is how we're going to bring prayer back into the
schools and, clearly, it was in the intent of the Georgia legislature to do that,
and I have a copy of the bill. In fact, it's the bill that I took a look at first,
and it was clearly their intent, and it's stated right in there, 'silent prayer'.
Their intent here is to bring prayer in. I guess they realized that this was
something they couldn't go for this time. So in that bill, you can see dot-dot-
dot, prayer crossed out and moment of sil- [sic] or reflection written above
it. ..
Id. (statement of Brian Bown).
325. Teacher Suspended Over "Moment of Silence' Sues District: Seeks Reinstatement,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 1994, at 3 ("'All I did was follow my beliefs and my
conscience,' claimed Mr. Bown."); see also Morning Edition: Teacher Fired After Ignoring
'Moment of Silence' (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 31, 1994,) (transcript # 1423-
14), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File (Brian Bown commenting on the Geor-
gia statute during an interview with Alex Chadwick of National Public Radio); Nathaniel
Sheppard Jr., Compromise on School Prayer Satisfies Few People in Georgia, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 15, 1994, at D14 (describing the experience of Quakers being forced to sit
through the mandatory silence period).
326. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1994) (emphasis added).
327. Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1568.
328. Id. at 1567.
329. Id. at 1572-86.
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Other states enacting moment of silence and "voluntary" prayer laws
include, but are not limited to, Arkansas, 330 Delaware, 331 Indiana, 332
Massachusetts, 333 New York,334 Ohio, 335 Mississippi, 336 North Caro-
lina, 337 Tennessee, 338 and Utah.339 It is odd, given the ground swell of
state moment of silence statutes, that national leaders are currently fo-
cused on amending the Constitution to allow "voluntary" prayer in public
schools.
Moment of silence statutes and school prayer in general has spawned a
powerful effort to amend (or replace) the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses. Two constitutional amendments were introduced into the
United States House of Representatives in November 1995.340 The first,
entitled the Religious Equality Amendment, was introduced by Congress-
man Henry Hyde on November 15, 1995.341 Although it focuses on dis-
crimination rather than school prayer, it would allow unfettered
government funding of religious organizations, including tax aid ("vouch-
ers") for religious schools.342 The second amendment, named the Reli-
gious Liberties Amendment, was introduced by Congressman Ernst
Istook on November 28, 1995.343 It would allow student-led prayer in
public schools and government display of religious symbols.344
330. The Arkansas Senate passed a bill requiring up to five minutes of daily silence in
public schools; the bill was modified in the House to allow local school boards to volunta-
rily adopt such a policy and, as of late 1995, was in the House Education Committee for
further debate. Church-State Debate: Brewing in Michigan and Arkansas, DAILY REP.
CARD, Feb. 10, 1995.
331. Although Delaware HB 499 passed the Delaware House of Representatives by a
vote of 38-0, the legislation lacks a workable implementation strategy; specifics must be
handled by each school district. Delaware House Passes Voluntary School Prayer Bill,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 16, 1994, at 5.
332. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-7-11 (Bums 1994) (moment of silence).
333. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 1A (Law. Co-op. 1994) (moment of silence).
334. NY CLS. EDUC. § 3029-a (1994) (moment of silence).
335. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.601 (Baldwin 1994) (moment of silence).
336. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-4 (1993) (authorizing student-initiated, student-led
prayer in public schools).
337. 1993 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 716 § 2. G.S. 115C-36(29) (moment of silence).
338. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004 (1994) (moment of silence).
339. 1991 Utah Laws 35(66) (moment of silence).
340. Bill Broadway, Schism Over School Prayer; Two GOP-Proposed Constitutional
Amendments Reflect Split in Conservative Thinking, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1995, at B7.
341. The full text of the amendment reads: "Neither the United States nor any State
shall deny benefits to or otherwise discriminate against any private person or group on
account of religious expression, belief or identity; nor shall the prohibition on laws respect-
ing an establishment of religion be construed to require such discrimination." Id.
342. Id.
343. The amendment reads:
To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of
conscience: Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit acknowledgments of
the religious heritage, beliefs, or traditions of the people, or prohibit student-
sponsored prayer in public schools. Neither the United States nor any State
shall compose any official prayer or compel joining in prayer, or discriminate





Opinions are split on the impact either amendment would have on the
First Amendment. For instance, Professor Michael McConnell, who
helped draft the Hyde amendment, explains that "[tihe principle function
of [the Hyde] proposal is to draw attention to the problem of discrimina-
tion against religion and influence the course of jurisprudence. ' 345 In-
deed, Professor McConnell believes that passage of the amendment is not
necessary to influence the courts on this issue. He points to the Equal
Rights Amendment which, despite failing, nevertheless spurred "the pro-
cess of national thought and deliberation," resulting in a restructuring of
judicial philosophy.346
Conversely, Pastor Barry Lynn, executive director of Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State, believes that either
amendment "would erase the doctrine of church-state separation from
the First Amendment. '347 Professor Douglass Laycock agrees, calling
the Hyde proposal a disguised "school prayer" amendment. 348 Testifying
before a congressional subcommittee, Professor Laycock called both pro-
posals antithetical to our constitutional tradition of government neutral-
ity towards religion.349
Although the future of both amendments hinges on the outcomes of
the 1996 national and state elections, the thought process and delibera-
tion envisioned by Professor McConnell is already taking place. For in-
stance, on July 12, 1995, President Clinton, surely attempting to preempt
the introduction of the amendments in Congress, sent a memorandum to
the Secretary of Education and the Attorney General explaining what
constitutes constitutionally protected religious expression in public
schools. 35° In the memorandum, the President asserts that public schools
are not "religion-free zones" and that students need not check their reli-
gious expression at the schoolhouse door.351 He further explains that
"the government's schools also may not discriminate against private reli-
gious expression during the school day."'352 The memorandum has since
been distributed to the nation's public schools.
In any event, Christian conservatives are playing an influential role in
the attempt to alter the First Amendment. The Christian Coalition in-
cluded a voluntary prayer amendment in its Contract With the American
Family, and Jay Sekulow joined with Professor McConnell and others in
345. Janan Hanna, Proposal Seeks 'Religious Equality'; 1st Amendment Would Be Rede-
fined, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 10, 1995 at C1.
346. Broadway, supra note 340, at B7.
347. Id.
348. Hanna, supra note 345, at C1.
349. See id.
350. Memorandum from President William Jefferson Clinton to the Secretary of Educa-
tion and the Attorney General of the United States (July 12, 1995), reprinted in William J.
Clinton, Religion-Free School?, LIBERTY, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 20.
351. Id.
352. Id. The President went on to discuss 16 topics affecting religious liberty, including
religious expression, prayer, student assignments, the Equal Access Act, and lunchtime
and recess activities. Id.
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the discussions that produced Congressman Hyde's proposal. 353 Chris-
tian conservatives are becoming one of the most powerful influences in
the political process. 354
Their ability to control elections traditionally marked by low voter
turn-out at the grassroots level and by the American voter apathy epi-
demic at the national level means that religious liberty is vacillating with
the ever-changing political scene, rather than remaining firmly en-
trenched in the Constitution. Such a proposition is not alarming due to
religious activism; indeed, Christianity and religion in general have been
and are good for the United States. Rather, it is the apparent willingness
of Christian conservatives to disregard the need to protect religious mi-
norities and their assault on contemporary religious liberty. William F.
Buckley, a highly respected and long-time conservative commentator and
nationally syndicated columnist, provides this paradigmatical assessment
of minority religious liberty rights: "If the minority has certain rights, so
does the minority when it grows into majority. Contrary arguments are
spinach, and the hell with them. '355
F. PERSECUTION COMPLEX
Just like what Nazi Germany did to the Jews, so liberal America is
now doing to the evangelical Christians .... It is the Democratic
Congress, the liberal-biased media and the homosexuals who want to
destroy all Christians! Wholesale abuse and discrimination and the
worst bigotry toward any group in America today! More terrible
than anything suffered by any minority in our history!356
The foregoing assessment by Pat Robertson has become common cur-
rency among Christian conservatives seeking to alter our current system
of religious liberty. There is a concerted attempt to portray Christians as
a persecuted minority. John Whitehead, president of the Rutherford In-
stitute, has in fact written a book attempting to validate this persecution
theory.357 In a Liberty magazine article, he refers to this "religious
apartheid" as "the separation of religion, particularly Christianity, from
all aspects of American public life."' 358 Mr. Whitehead and others believe
that Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education359 was the
353. Hanna, supra note 345, at C1.
354. See, e.g., Mary Ann Roser, Might Makes Right; Organized, Committed and Politi-
cally Savvy, Christian Conservatives Have Gained a Foothold in the Texas Republican
Party-and They're Not Stopping There, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 25, 1996
("By winning precinct chairmanships, religious conservatives took over the [Texas] GOP
two years ago, making Texas one of about 20 states where that has occurred.").
355. William F. Buckley, Jr., Nothing is Wrong With Prayer in Schools .. , HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 4, 1994, at 03.
356. Molly Ivins, Christian Coalition Isn't Fundamentalist in its Democratic Beliefs,
STAR TRIB., Sept. 19, 1993, at 23A (quoting Pat Robertson).
357. See JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, RELIGIOUS APARTHEID (1994).
358. John W. Whitehead, Religious Apartheid: The Systematic Elimination of Christian-
ity From American Public Life, LIBERTY, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 7.
359. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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beginning of this societal cleansing of religion in America.36)
Christian conservatives have a powerful ally on this theory: Justice
Antonin Scalia. On April 9, 1996, Justice Scalia delivered a prayer break-
fast speech at the Mississippi College School of Law. The event was
sponsored by the school's chapter of the Christian Legal Society. During
his speech Justice Scalia chided the "worldly wise" for their scorn of
Christianity. 361 He asserts that those who believe in miracles and the res-
urrection of Christ are regarded by society as "simple-minded. '362 "We
are fools for Christ's sake," Justice Scalia proclaimed, and Christians
"must pray for the courage to endure the scorn of the sophisticated
world. "363
There are many, however, who disagree with the persecution theory of
Christian conservatives. For instance, James Dunn, executive director of
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, addressing Justice Scalia's
comments, retorted, "[R]eligion in America is a powerful and pervasive
force, and Christianity is the best-funded, the largest and the most power-
ful religious group in America. There's something almost laughable to
me about Christians whimpering and whining about being persecuted. ' '364
In short, Mr. Dunn is correct. The vast majority of American adults
(86.5%) identify themselves as Christian. 365 Christians also have a com-
manding presence in the legislature. Nearly all of the 104th Congress
carry the Christian label (93% or 497 of 535 members).366 There are
more than 215 seminaries and theological academies in the United States;
more than 500,000 clergy; about 358,194 churches or houses of worship;
more than 444 religious periodicals published every year; at least 1,840
full-time Christian radio and television stations; 3,400 stores that belong
to the Christian Booksellers Association; and at least 120 predominantly
Christian, religion-based lobbies at the federal level.367
Furthermore, the predominantly Christian public naturally, contrary to
Justice Scalia's assertions, displays a fondness for religious figures. Pope
John Paul II, Mother Teresa, and Billy Graham consistently rank at or
360. Whitehead, supra note 358, at 8.
361. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Makes the Case for Christianity; Justice Proclaims Belief in
Miracles, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
362. Id.
363. Id. Justice Scalia was quoting I Corinthians 4:10, albeit for purposes other than
what the Apostle Paul intended. Justice Scalia is an honorable man; and although he did
not violate any conflict of interest rules, his statements are, to say the least, inappropriate.
His wild assertions create the appearance of impropriety; they have forever comprised
public perception of his objectivity for any future religious liberty case that he takes part
in. See supra note 315 and accompanying text (Jay Sekulow, who no doubt agrees with
Justice Scalia's assertion, will likely argue future cases before the Supreme Court). Though
religious convictions are a valuable asset, public comments by Supreme Court justices that
flow from politically and legally active members of the public are better left unsaid.
364. Crossfire: Is America Frowning on Faith? (Cable News Network television broad-
cast, Apr. 10, 1996) (transcript #1626), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
365. Albert J. Menendez & Edd Doerr, Persecution Complex, LIBERTY, Mar.-Apr.
1995, at 12.
366. Id. (citation omitted).
367. Id. at 12, 13 (citations omitted).
1634 [Vol. 49
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
near the top of Gallup Polls measuring the most admired men and wo-
men.368 The clergy are consistently among the most admired figures in
America, particularly on the issue of integrity. They are much more
widely admired than doctors, lawyers, teachers, and a host of other
professionals. 369
If the government and "worldly wise" are attempting to persecute
Christians and drive religion from public life, they are not doing a very
good job. It is safe to say that Christians are not in fact being persecuted.
Nevertheless, this argument is being advanced in an attempt to influence
the thought process and deliberation of Congress and the courts. Chris-
tian conservatives, however, have a more ambitious goal than mere
thoughtful dialog. Church-state separation is the primary target of those
who adhere to the persecution theory.
The Christian conservative position on church-state separation is clear:
It should not exist. This is the logical conclusion reached by examining
their religious liberty rhetoric.370 Furthermore, their presence will rever-
berate through state legislatures in the coming months with the tax aid
for parochial and other private school initiatives, known as "vouchers" or
"school choice" in Christian conservative circles. 371 School choice initia-
tives will probably be the subject of legislative activity in more than
twelve states.372 These proposals, along with the moment of silence stat-
368. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
369. Id. From a financial standpoint, Christian organizations are among the most pros-
perous in the country. In 1992, contributions to 44 Protestant denominations totaled
$16,647,464,955, a figure that excludes Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, and Eastern Ortho-
dox churches. Id. at 16 (citation omitted). All churches enjoy tax exempt status, and 20
years ago church assets exceeded $150 billion, plus $20 billion in yearly income. Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
370. As Beverly LaHaye, founder and president of the conservative Concerned Women
of America, proclaimed:
[T]oday instead of protecting our right to freely exercise our religious faith in
public places, publicly honoring our God and Creator as our Forefathers did,
we are forbidden to speak, to pray aloud, to read the Bible, to even teach
Judeo-Christian values in our public schools and other public places because
of an imaginary "wall of separation" conjured by non-believers.
CANTOR, supra note 274, at 5. Gary North, founder of the Institute for Christian Econom-
ics, claims that "there is no religious neutrality." Id. at 6 (quoting BILL MOYERS, GOD AND
POLITICS (1987)); "Government and true Christianity are inseparable," says Robert Si-
monds, founder and president of Citizens for Excellence in Education. Id. (quoting ROB-
ERT SIMONDS, How TO ELECT CHRISTIANS TO PUBLIC OFFICE (1985)). Pastor W. A.
Criswell, senior pastor of Dallas' First Baptist Church, made this telling assessment the day
after delivering the benediction at the Republican National Convention: "There is no such
thing as separation of church and state. It is merely a figment of the imagination of infi-
dels." Id.; Paul Weyrich, founder and president of the Free Congress Foundation,
threatened, "We're radicals working to overturn the present structure in this country-
we're talking about Christianizing America." REICHLEY, supra note 29, at 331.
371. See Carole Ware & Lyn Hutchins, 2 Sides to the Issue of School Vouchers, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 15, 1995, at 23D; V. Dion Haynes, Foes Attack School-Voucher
Plan: Program's Successes, Legality Questioned, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 9, 1995, at S6.
372. Joseph L. Conn, Voucher Avalanche: Battles Over Tax Aid to Parochial and Other
Private Schools Loom in Congress and a Dozen State Legislatures, CHURCH & STATE, Feb.
1995, at 5-6. At first glance, school choice initiatives, which will result in the nondiscrimi-
natory, compulsory use of state or federal tax dollars to support religious institutions, pres-
ent serious religious liberty questions. These questions will be resolved in court. See
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utes and other coming religious liberty issues, will undoubtedly result in
court challenges that will test the judiciary's partisan approach to reli-
gious liberty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of American religious liberty is clouded by deep divisions in
the academic, judicial, and political arenas. Scholars have failed over the
years to agree on the proper interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, 373 heavily criticizing the twenty-five-year-old Lemon test.374 The
judiciary has shown a willingness to disarm the Free Exercise Clause and
disregard stare decisis,375 and Christian conservative activists-who have
arrived as a political force-display an alarming degree of contempt for
church-state separation. 376
These factors combine to threaten the greatest and most distinguishing
asset of the United States: the American religious liberty model.377 Our
country developed this concept without the aid of a historical prototype.
No other country in recorded history has maintained a system of separa-
tion and free exercise, and, consequently, no country is as prosperous or
as powerful as the United States. Assuredly, capitalism, democracy,
property rights, and a constitution, among other things, have contributed
to the success of this nation. Still, American religious liberty is the sole
aspect that has no root in European common law or otherwise.
As scholars have observed, there is no "single, unifying theory of con-
stitutional interpretation" and the search for such "may be chimerical. '378
Yet our current system of religious liberty, including Lemon despite its
imperfection 379 and Sherbert with its sterling mandate of strict scrutiny,
represents the very essence of what James Madison considered vital to
the health and success of our nation: "[T]he equal right of every citizen
to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of con-
Plaintiffs in Ohio Voucher Law Suit File for Summary Judgment, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 18,
1996, at City Desk available in, LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Dale D. Buss, Court
Halts Milwaukee Program Educational Vouchers in Wisconsin, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct.
23, 1995, at 78. Furthermore, the initiatives are strikingly similar to Patrick Henry's non-
preferential, nondiscriminatory government aid to all religions. See supra note 58 and ac-
companying text.
373. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause,
82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113 (1988).
374. See, e.g., Ronald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L. REV. 881 (1993).
375. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
376. See supra parts V.D.-F.
377. As Judge Kogan of the Florida Supreme Court cogently stated: "[N]othing... is
more private or sacred than one's religion or view of life ... It is difficult to overstate this
right because it is, without exaggeration, the very bedrock upon which this country was
founded." Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989).
378. Conkle, supra note 373, at 1193.




science. '380 The reversal of Lemon-which appears to be inevitable- 381
or the repeal or invalidation of the RFRA will result in an end to the
unique American religious liberty model. The resulting constitutional
standard, be it Justice Scalia's majority rule tradition test, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's nonpreferential aid, or Justices Kennedy and O'Connor's co-
ercion test, will likely lead to an increasingly intimate church-state rela-
tionship. Although the return of socialized religion is not probable,
increased government entanglement will surely follow. This is disheart-
ening because the only thing that government can do to religion is con-
taminate it. Simply put, our current system of religion and government
should be maintained.
American religious liberty, however, unfortunately appears dependent
upon the outcome of increasingly partisan political elections. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have a singular religious
liberty judicial philosophy; one that is regrettably contrary to the legacy
of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The retirement of one or more
justices (other than the aforementioned three), coupled with the appoint-
ment of a justice who shares the establishment and free exercise views of
the current bloc, will trigger a wholesale departure from current religious
liberty jurisprudence. The mere possibility of this departure runs afoul of
the admonition given from one Founding Father to the other: "As Jeffer-
son said to Madison, so Madison may be saying to us over the arch of
time: 'Take care of me when I am dead."' 382
380. A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 59.
381. In 1995, the Court made a wholesale departure from a litany of prior cases by
forcing the University of Virginia to fund a student-run religious publication. Rosenberger
v Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2070 (1995). The Court did not,
however, despite numerous amicus brief requests to the contrary, overrule Lemon v.
Kurtzman. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial merry-go-
round involving the RFRA).
382. Commager, supra note 91, at 336.
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